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ABSTRACT
The dissertation attempts to empirically verify the Oliva/ 
Capdevielle Cusp Catastrophe Theory Model of Collective Bargaining 
Prior to this time, no direct tests of catastrophe theory have 
been made in the social sciences. This study tries to directly 
use the equations of the model to predict system behavior.
Data were gathered by use of a laboratory experiment which 
included the playing of a collective bargaining game and the 
administration of questionnaires. Sixteen students were divided 
into 4 two-team groups. Each group contained one management and 
one union bargaining team.
Actual data from the bargaining systems were compared with 
predicted data from the model using the Pearson Product Moment 
Coefficient of Correlation. Overall results yielded a correlation 
coefficient of .70 which is suggestive of the model's validity.
The dissertation includes an overview of the cusp cata­
strophe theory model, as well as a basic typology of standard mode 
found in collective bargaining. The appendix contain the raw data 
developed from the experiment.
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study
"In the past three decades collective bargaining has 
become an important part of the system of making economic 
decisions in the United States. Critical decisions con­
cerning utilization of resources and distribution of the 
proceeds from production have come within the scope of 
the bargaining process. Today, few business managers - 




Today, almost twenty years later,the statement by Weber is
even more true, particularly in light of a situation when there are
growing demands for an apparently shrinking supply of resources.
Unfortunately, our success at modelling the collective bargaining
2situation has been somewhat limited. Walton and McKersie suggest 
that most research has been focused on specific and limited situations 
only, with little effort made to develop models that encompass major 
areas within collective bargaining. One reason for the difficulty 
has been the lack of techniques that can handle abrupt changes in
Arnold Weber, The Structure of Collective Bargaining: Pro­
blems and Perspectives, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York, 
1961, p. 7.
2Anatol Rapoport, Game Theory As A Theory of Conflict Resolu­
tion, D.. Reidel Publishing Company, Boston, 1974, Vol. 2, p. 1.
1
2
the behavior of the system such as strikes or lockouts. However, 
recently, a relatively new area of mathematics called catastrophe
3
theory has opened up some interesting possibilities. Rene Thom's
book Structural Stability and Morphogenesis provides the conceptual
framework for catastrophe theory. During the past six years, appli-
4 , 5cations of the theory have been attempted in physics, biology, 
economics,^* and psychology,^ focusing particularly on system 
dynamics where sudden transitions are an integral part of the 
behavior pattern.
3Rene Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, W.A. 
Benjamin, Inc., New York, 1975.
4E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers, 1972-
1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading Mass., 1977, 
pp. 16-17.
~*E.C. Zeeman, "Differential Equations for the Heartbeat and 
Nerve Impulse;" "Primary and Secondary Waves in Developmental 
Biology;" "A Clock and Wavefront Model for the Control of Repeated 
Structures During Animal Morphogenesis," coauthored with J. Cook; 
"Gastrulation and Formation of Somites in Amphibia and Birds;" 
"Dialogue Between A Biologist and a Mathematician;" "Brain Modelling;" 
"Duffing's Equation in Brain Modelling." All found in Catastrophe 
Theory: Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977, pp. 81-301.
^W.S. Brown, "An Economic Application of Catastrophe Theory," 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Colorado, 1977. E.C. Zeeman, 
"On the Unstable Behaviour of Stock Exchanges," "Conflicting Judge­
ments Caused by Stress," Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers, 1972-
1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977, 
pp. 361-385. Yves Balasko, "The Behavior of Economic Equilibria: A
Catastrophe Theory Approach," Behavioral Science, (September 1978), 
Vol. 23, pp. 375-382.
^W.S. Dochens, III, "Induction/Catastrophe Theorv: A Behav­
ioral Ecological Approach to Cognition in Human Individuals," 
Behavioral Science (March 1979), Vol. 24, pp. 94-111. E.C. Zeeman, 
et. al., "A Model for Institutional Disturbances," Catastrophe
3
g
In 1977 Oliva and Capdevielle developed a model of col­
lective bargaining using catastrophe theory as its underlying 
structure. And, like most "applications" of catastrophe theory in 
the social sciences, the model seemed to have fairly high face 
validity and offered some interesting conclusions. But if a model
is ultimately to be of any value it must be tested empirically.
9
Murthy developed a rough empirical test of the model's descriptive 
effectiveness in 1978 by developing six operational hypotheses 
regarding the movement of the independent variables.
That is, by looking at the descriptive model, Murthy was 
able to develop six hypotheses about the movement of the independent 
variables and their concomitant results in terms of the expected 
bargaining behavior.^
To measure the independent variables Murthy developed a col­
lective bargaining game which was played by 35 four person groups.
As each team completed various sections of the game, a questionnaire
Theory: Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977, pp. 387-401. Brian R. Flay, 
"Catastrophe Theory in Social Psychology: Some Applications to
Attitudes and Social Behavior," Behavioral Science, (September 1978), 
Vol. 23, pp. 335-350.
g
Terence A. Oliva and Christel M. Capdevielle, "Collective 
Bargaining as a Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of the Academy of 
Management, 1977, pp. 177-181 (paper in the Proceedings is different 
from that actually presented due to revisions).
9H.S.K. Murthy, "An Experimental Evaluation of the Descrip­
tive Effectiveness of the Cusp Catastrophe Model in Simulated 




was administered to the participants which yielded a bargaining 
intensity for the union and management representatives, as well as 
an estimate of the actual behavior of the overall system. By 
referring to his hypotheses, Murthy then predicted the expected 
behavior of the system. Using a Chi-Square test over the 258 data 
points, he found there to be no significant difference between the 
expected frequencies and the observed frequencies at the .05 level.
The approach used by Murthy is essentially an empirical 
test of the qualitative nature of the model since it did not make 
explicit use of the mathematics of the model. And, as such, it is 
an indirect and somewhat gross test even though the results are 
positive.
It is the purpose of this study to develop a direct test of 
the model by explicitly using the mathematics of the model to predict 
behavior based on various combinations of the input variables as 
found in real world situations.
Statement of the Problem
The problem to be examined by this dissertation is to 
develop a direct empirical test of the Oliva/Capdevielle Catastrophe 
Theory Model of collective bargaining by:
(1) developing empirical measures for the model's independent 
variables, viz. management and union bargaining 
intensities,
(2) using the equation of the catastrophe surface to predict 
bargaining behavior,
(3) develop empirical measures of the bargaining system's 
behavior,
(4) and finally, to compare the model's predicted behavior 
against the system's actual behavior.
Significance of the Problem
The significance of the problem may be judged in several 
ways. First, there are almost no empirical tests of catastrophe 
theory models in the social sciences. In fact, the only one found 
in the references listed earlier is that of prison disorders. To 
date, all so-called applications have been merely descriptive.
Since the theory has been advanced as a new modelling structure that 
represents a quantum jump over one's ability to describe social 
science situations, it is important to ascertain the appropriateness 
of that assertion through empirical testing.
Secondly, as stated earlier, models of collective bargaining 
have been severely limited in their description of bargaining. The 
model being tested seems to have new potential for describing the 
overall bargaining situation beyond that of an "optimal" determina­
tion of wages that is not reflected in real-world behavior of 
bargaining decisions. That is, the model allows for the qualitative 
inclusion of bargaining with mathematical rigor.
6
Lastly, since this type of modelling technique is not found 
in the bargaining literature, its validation would help researchers 
by providing a new tool for analysis which has not been used before. 
In this sense the direct empirical validation of the model will go 
a long way in pushing back the frontiers of knowledge in this area 
of collective bargaining.
Limitations
Since the study is the first attempt at a significant move 
toward quantification of the collective bargaining model by way of 
a direct empirical test, there are a number of limitations which 
must be considered.
1. From a mathematical point of view, the shape of the mathe­
matical surface did not exactly portray the intended model for two 
reasons: (a) it would be a study in itself to develop the appropri­
ate real-world coefficients for the model, and (b) it is most 
probable that each bargaining interaction would require a different 
set of coefficients because of both differences in the individual 
participants as well as the nature of the bargaining situation."^
2. Raw data was developed from a role-playing bargaining 
game using students; and, as good as role-playing games might be, 
they are still artificial situations with artificial players which 
may hamper the external validity.
^E.C. Zeeman, et. al., "A Model for Institutional Distur­
bances," o£. cit., pp. 387-402.
7
3. The nine interruptions needed to take measurements during 
the role-playing exercise may have caused probe effects. Unfortu­
nately, it is not possible to predict in advance the nature of these 
effects. Attempts were made to block for this problem.
4. The sample size is small relative to the number of 
possible points on the surface or even a reasonable subset of those 
points. Both cost and time play a major role in limiting sample 
size. Additionally, it is assumed that this was in part a pre­
liminary study which, if succes-rul, will precipitate a number of 
other more detailed studies.
5. The surface point may be incorrectly described, that is, 
the ranges for strike, lockout, etc., may not be accurately assigned. 
Here again, much more testing would be needed before a "perfect" set 
of ranges could be developed.
Plan of Development
Chapter II presents an overview of some of the major types 
of collective bargaining models. No attempt is made to cover every 
model, since the model being tested is morphologically different 
from any of the bargaining models currently found in the literature. 
Rather, the major structures are presented. Part two of the chapter 
gives a general overview of catastrophe theory and in particular, 
the cusp model.
Chapter III deals with a description of the actual model as 
an outgrowth of the Stagner and Rosen, Pigou-based, limits type
8
model. The requirements for the cusp model are presented in terms 
of the bargaining situation to show the model's appropriateness for 
collective bargaining.
Chapter IV presents the methodology for testing the model. 
Included are the mathematical manipulations needed to transform the 
basic cusp into one more suitable for the experiment as well as the 
basic description of the experiment itself.
Chapter V gives the results of the findings of the study. 
Data provided by the questionnaire and the model, as well as the 
analysis are presented. Conclusions from the analysis of the data 
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Chapter II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE RELEVANT TO THE STUDY
Collective Bargaining
Collective Bargaining Defined
In general, bargaining can be viewed as a form of bilateral 
negotiations between entities.’* From a systems standpoint, it is 
an exchange process where the exchange is defined as the movement
2of matter, energy, and/or information between (or among) systems.
Bargaining occurs when the systems involved in the exchange process
believe they can improve their current positions. Consequently,
bargaining is possible if the systems perceive they can improve,
4maintain, or lose less than if they did not bargain. For the two 
system case, which is the focus of this study, the possible outcomes 
of any exchange process may be simplified to:
^S. LaTour, P. Houlden, L. Walker, and J. Thibout, "Some 
Determinants of Preference Modes of Conflict Resolution." Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 1976, Vol. 20, p. 320.
2James G. Miller, Living Systems, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
New York, 1979.
3Ian Morley and Geoffrey Stephenson, The Social Psychology 
of Bargaining, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1977.
^Alan Coddington, Theories of the Bargaining Process, Aldine 
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1968.
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1. both systems gain
2. one system gains, the other stays the same
3. both systems stay the same
4. one gains the other loses
5. one stays the same, the other loses
6. both lose.
Some possible examples of the foregoing outcomes for two- 
person situations might be as follows:
1. trade between individuals
2. teacher/student, relationship
3. mutual exchange of previously known information
4. master/slave
5. applicant turns down job offer
6. street fight.
While perceptions (and concomi tant utilities) stir the 
impetus for bargaining, five conditions are necessary to consumate 
the actual process:
1. there are two or more parties with divergent interests,
2. the parties can communicate,
3. mutual compromise is possible,
4. provisional offers can be made, and
5. the provisional offers do not fix the tangible outcome 
until an offer is accepted by all sides.
^J.M. Chertkoff and J.K. Esser, "A Review of Experiments in 
Explicit Bargaining,11 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
1976, Vol. 12, p. 464.
13
From a managerial standpoint, one of the more important bar­
gaining situations involves that occurring between employees and 
employers regarding the work situation. In particular, the bargaining 
which occurs between management and labor unions (to include profes­
sional organizations that bargain) over wages, hours, and working 
conditions is among the more crucial types due to the complexity 
of modern society and the ability to affect large segments of the 
population by disruptions in the bargaining process. The general 
term for union/management bargaining is "collective bargaining." 
Specifically:
1. The collective bargaining process can be thought of as 
a complex network of events in the unionized organiza­
tion ... that determines wages and fringe benefits, 
hours, and working conditions and that introduce a 
unique kind of transactional relationship between two 
institutions.̂
2. Collective bargaining is a continuous relationship 
between a defined group of employees represented by a 
union or association and an e m p l o y e r . ^
3. Collective bargaining ... involves representatives of 
groups ... where, bargaining is defined simply as the 
process of negotiating for agreement.^
4. Collective bargaining is a pure power relationship 
between management and the union, in which conflict 
exists over the control of functions in employment
6Wendall French, The Personnel Management Process: Human
Resources Administration, 3rd Edition, Houghton-Mifflin Company, 
Boston, 1974, p. 55.
^William F. Glueck, Personnel: A Diagnostic Approach,
Business Publications, Inc., Dallas, Texas, 1974, p. 567.
g
Morley and Stephenson, o£. cit., pp. 26-27.
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relations. Both management and the union attempt, 
through economic power, to retain the functions 
under their jurisdiction at the time of the bargain­
ing process. Through power relationships, each party  ̂
attempts to encroach upon the other party's functions.
5. Collective bargaining is:
A. a means of contracting for the sale of labor
B. a form of industrial government
C. a method of management.-^
If the essence of the above collective bargaining definitions 
is extracted, one can simply view collective bargaining as the 
bilateral negotiations between two groups. Furthermore, collective 
bargaining then becomes a special case of bargaining, in general, an 
area where somewhat extended modelling has been attempted.
Bargaining Relations
The dynamics of the bargaining (from this point on, the terms 
"bargaining" and "collective bargaining" will be used interchangeably) 
systems depend on the nature of the relationship between the dyads, 
just as the nature of the outcome of the exchange process depends on 
the nature of the relationship between the two parties. In a sense, 
the relationship and outcome are one and the same as in the master/ 
slave situation.
Descriptions of the theoretical collective bargaining rela­
tionship sets are shown in Figure 1 below:
9C. Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, Jr., Collective Bargain­
ing: Principles and Practices, 2nd Edition, Houghton Mifflin Co.,
Boston, 1966, p. 9.
■^Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, New York, 1951, p. 121.
FIGURE 1
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP SETS
(1) CONFLICT CONTAINMENT ACCOMMODATION COOPERATION
(2) ARMED WORKING UNION-MANAGEMENTTRUCE HARMONY COOPERATION
AGGRESSION MODERATE
(3) AND REPRESSED JOINT
RESISTANCE HOSTILITY PARTICIPATION QUIESENCE COOPERATION
STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE
(4) OF OF POWER OF OF OF DEAL OF
CONFLICT CONTAINMENT BARGAINING ACCOMMODATION COOPERATION BARGAINING
Source: C. Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, Jr., Collective Bargaining: Principles and
Practices, 2nd Edition, Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966, p. 29.
16
Essentially, the scales are structurally isomorphic and the 
differences represent semantic preferences rather than substantive 
change. Structure number three in the figure was used as an empiri­
cal base by Derber, et. al.,^ to determine which relationship 
prevailed in industry. They found that out of 37 firms examined,
31 ol: the firms could be characterized as "Moderate Joint 
Participation." Additionally, the author found through a follow-up 
study that over time:
Cl) union-management relationships were relatively stable 
despite dynamic environments;
(2) frequent small changes occurred in the relationships, 
due to various environmental factors; and
(3) the broad goals of the parties were relatively 
stable, but the short-run goals were particularly 
flexible.
What the foregoing suggests is that while relationships may 
be generally stable, in any given period they may range over the 
scale from overt hostility to complete cooperation. This would be 
particularly true in the time periods just before, through, and just 
after negotiations.
It is also interesting that the most common relationship 
found was participation and not conflict, since a number of models
11R. Derber, et. al., Human Organizations, (Winter 1962-63), 
Vol. 21, pp. 242-270.
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12of the bargaining process assume a conflict oriented situation.
The reason for this stems from the fact that the basic characteristics 
of the conflict situation are similar to those of bargaining. Con­
sider the list of conditions for bargaining presented earlier and 
those for conflict which are presented below:
(1) At least two parties (individuals or groups) are involved 
in some kind of interaction.
(2) Mutually exclusive goals and/or mutually exclusive 
values exist in fact, or as perceived by the parties 
involved.
(3) Interaction is characterized by behavior designed to 
defeat, reduce, or suppress the opponent or to gain 
a mutually designated victory.
(4) The parties face each other with mutually opposing 
actions and counter actions.
(5) Each party attempts to create an imbalance or rela- ^  
tively favored position of power vis-a-vis the other.
It would appear that the basic difference between the two 
lists is the more negative emphasis of the conflict conditions rela­
tive to those of bargaining in general. In fact, bargaining would 
subsume conflict, since it allows for more alternatives, some of 
which include those of the conflict situation.
12 See for example Daniel Druckman and Thomas Bonoma, "Deter­
minants of Bargaining Behavior in a Bilateral Monopoly Situation II'. 
Opponents' Concession Rate and Similarity." Behavioral Science, 
(1976), Vol. 21, pp. 252-262, and E. Allen Slusher, "Counterpart 
Strategy, Prior Relations, and Constituent Pressure in a Bargaining 
Simulation," Behavioral Science, (1978), Vol. 23, pp. 470-477.
13Allan C. Filley, Interpersonal Conflict Resolution, Scott, 
Foresman and Company, Glenview, Illinois, 1975, p. 4. For a detailed 
discussion of goals in decision-making see Thomas A. Kochan, G.P.
Huber and L.L. Cummings, "Determinants of Intraorganizational Conflict
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From the preceding one can conclude that exchange, bargain­
ing, collective bargaining, and conflict are closely intertwined 
processes; and that due to the dynamic nature of each process, it is 
often difficult to separate them into neat and distinct categories. 
This becomes evident in the next section on models, as many authors 
tend to use the terms somewhat interchangeably. For the most part, 
this is not a critical problem until generalizations are made, or 
new theories are developed based on the models. However, this 
problem seems endemic to research and modelling and not just to 
collective bargaining.
Models in Bargaining
There is no easy way to classify bargaining models. The dif­
ficulty comes, in part, from the fact that true analysis of the 
bargaining phenomenon requires an interdisciplinary (systems) approach
to which there has been some resistance to date, involving as a
14minimum, psychology and economics. Furthermore, when models are 
developed, they may come from a variety of areas, both basic and 
hybrid, such that they are focusing on different aspects of the 
bargaining process and are, therefore, not easily integrated.
in Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector," Administrative 
Science Quarterly, (March 1975), Vol. 20, pp. 10-20.
14Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouracker, Bargaining and 
Decision Making: Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., New York, 1969, p. 5.
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Fouracker and Siegel imply that a quantitative analysis may bring 
the modellers together.
As a general statement, the current models can be divided 
into prescriptive and descriptive models. The prescriptive models 
for the most part are mathematical, while the descriptive models 
tend to be verbal. This being the case, the terms mathematical 
and verbal will be used as the major categories for the purposes 
of this paper. It is recognized that there is a continuum along 
which models actually fall, and that this categorization may force 
a certain model into a classification which only barely describes
its nature. If this has been done it is in order to help emphasize
the relevance and importance of the model being evaluated in this 
research. Figure 2 below gives an overview of the general classi­
fication of types of bargaining models.
Notice that in the model hierarchy, mathematical models 
have more echelons than the verbal models. This occurs for pri­
marily three reasons:
(1) Mathematical models can be pushed further and refined 
by increasing the number of relationships, variables, 
types of analysis, and reducing semantic r>ciui vocation.
(2) The economic base, particularly wage determinants
and utility theory, has spurred more interest in these
types of models.
15Ibid. , p. 5.
FIGURE 2
BARGAINING MODEL TYPOLOGY
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(3) Verbal models cannot easily be subjected to increased 
resolution. In fact, the increased resolution usually 
requires a new language (generally mathematics).
In this section which follows, a representative of each of 
the major types of model listed will be reviewed. The intent is to 
give the reader an overview of model types rather than a definitive 
listing of all bargaining models.
Mathematical Models
Economic Models - Utility
As stated earlier, one of the major disciplines which supplies
input to bargaining models is that of economics. Obviously, this is
16a result of the wage setting aspect of the bargaining process. 
Furthermore, because of economics' quantitative roots which are 
based on utility theory, many of the mathematical models of bargain­
ing behavior are utility theoretic oriented.
In its most simple and general form this situation may be 
represented as follows in Figure 3, where the gain in utilities 
of bargainers one and two are represented by x and y respectively, 
and the solution (negotiation) set is represented by the arc. A 
specific solution is represented by the point (x^, y^). That is,
16John C. Anderson, "Determinants of Bargaining Outcome in 
the Federal Government of Canada," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, January 1979, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 224-241.
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it is assumed that the bargainers will try to maximize their
. 17respective utilities.
FIGURE 3
THE ELEMENTARY BARGAINING PROBLEM
Y
.(x ,y ;
x = Utility of Bargainer 1 
y = Utility of Bargainer 2
arc = Negotiation set
(x,y)= A Solution
Source: Paul Swingle, The Structure of Conflict, Academic Press,
New York, 1970, p. 10.
17Paul Swingle, The Structure of Conflict, Academic Press, 
New York, 1970, p. 10.
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Leap states it somewhat more formally using a slightly dif- 
18ferent notation set:
(1) A pair of variables, x^, x  ̂ represent demands of two 
bargainers at any point in time.
(2) A pair of utility functions U^(x^) and U 2 (x2 ) exist.
It is assumed that the utility functions are increasing
such that "more of something" is always better and has
a higher level of utility. Therefore, Uj(x^) > 0 and 
U^(x2) > 0.
(3) A fixed amount m exists such that disagreement between 
them occurs if x^+x2 > m ’ ‘ '
In Leap's analysis, three models which make explicit use of
utilities are examined in detail. They are models by Edgeworth,
19Zeuthen, and Pen. Since the basic morphogenesis of the models is
the same, i.e., utilities, the paper will only briefly review two
utility oriented models; a) Zeuthen-Harsanyi, based on the risk pro­
blem applied to the maximization of expected utilities; and b) Nash, 
which has a game theoretic base.^
18Terry Leap, "An Analysis of Bargaining Theories Which Make 
Explicit Use of Economic Utility Functions," Unpublished paper, p. 3.
19Ibid., pp. 5-9.
20George deMenil, Bargaining: Monopoly Power versus Union
Power, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, p. 15-20.
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Zeuthen-Harsanyi Model - Essentially this approach assumes that the
participants will continue to evaluate the alternatives of accepting
the opponent's offer. He may, however, hold out for his current
demand where the risk is that of incurring a stalemate which has no
21utility for the bargainer.
Let 1 and 2 represent the bargainers such that their utility 
of an outcome is to each U(l) and U(2) respectively. If 1 opens with 
an offer that would result in 11(11) and U(21) for he and 2, while 2 
opens with U(22) and U (12) for he and 1, the situation may be por­




Source: George deMenil, Bargaining: Monopoly Power Versus Union
Power, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, p. 16.
^^Ibid . , p. 15.
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If 2 accepts the offer from 1, he gets U (12); while if he 
holds out, he risks the probability of a stalemate, P, and his 
expected utility becomes (1-P) U(22). The model assumes that 2's 
willingness to resist is a function of the risk he is willing to 
endure in order to get his demand. That is, he will resist as long
as
(1-P) U(22) ^ U (12) and
the limit will be
(1-P) 11(22) = U (12) or
P U (22) U (12) 
U (22)
The Zeuthen-Harsanyi's conclusion is that the party with
the lowest tolerance for risk will reduce his demand and that the
1 2  22 limit is the point where U U is a maximum. It should be pointed
out that Leap's presentation is somewhat more correct as he includes
the probability of a stalemate and talks in terms of each person's
23propensity for risk.
(l-rp Uu  + r1U1 * U12
(l-r 2) U 22 + r2ii2 * D 21
22 Ibid., p. 15.
23Leap, o£. cit., p. 6,
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Nash Model - With the work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, game
24theory, utility theory, and economics are joined. Game theory 
relates to bargaining behavior in that it is a theory of rational 
decision-making in conflict situations, which may be defined by:
(1) a set of decision makers called players,
(2) a set of strategies available to each player,
(3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of
particular choices of strategies made by the 
players on a given play of the game, and
(4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each 
of the possible outcomes.25
What Nash did was to look at the game theoretic structure
and conclude that it involved four axioms which he proved would
2 6yield a single solution point. Nash's four axioms are:
(1) Efficiency: The solution must lie on the utility
frontier.
(2) Symmetry: If the utility increment frontier is 
symmetrical, the solution gives equal utility 
increments to both parties.
(3) Transformat ion Invariances: The solution is not 
altered by a linear, order-preserving transforma­
tion of the utility function of either party.
24John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior, Princeton Press, Princeton, N.J., 1944.
25Rapoport, c>£. cit., p. 1. See also John C. Harsanyi, 
Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social 
Situations, Cambridge University Press, London, 1977.
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George deMenil, op. cit.. , p. 9.
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(4) Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Suppose the
solution for a given utility frontier has been found.
If that utility frontier is favorably altered anywhere 
except at the solution point, the solution is not 
changed.
Because of the complexity of the model, only its basic 
equations are presented to give the reader a feel for the nature
of its basic structure. What follows has been taken from deMenil's
i 27work.
Assumptions:
(1) the employer produced a product x whose demand curve 
is given by P = P(x; p, I) where P = price, p =
general price index, I = aggregate income.
(2) the long-run production function is given by
x = x ( E ,  K; t) Xtfhich is twice differentiable and 
convex, E = number of workers, K = capital stock.
(3) all employees belong to one union, which gets numbers 
from an infinitely elastic supply at the going wage 
rate from nonunion industries. The going wage rate =
Q
W . W = union wage rate.
(4) Employers' utility is a function of monopoly profits
ir = PX - WE - RK (where R is the rental on capital stock) 
esuch that U = a + a, n.o 1
(5) Union's utility function is a result of the differences 
between real wage bill (b) and what real wages would
27Ibid., p. 21-27.
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be if its members earned nonunion wages; when B is 
the difference and UU = b^ + b^ fU(B);
WE - WaE
(6) B is the real wage surplus.
Model:
From the assumptions one gets:
(1) The union wants to maximize B, while the employer wants 
to maximize tt
(2) The joint result is that of maximizing the sum of the 
two functions or
PX - W3E - RK and E and K
are determined by taking first partials with respect to x.
R = (P = 9P x) 9X
V 9X BK
(3) Through appropriate substitution the following result 
occurs,
WE - WaE tt - tt° (3fU/9B)B
tt fu(B)-f U(B°)
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which determines the distribution of income between 
employer and union and is the prime motivation for 
developing this model.
The model itself is static and looks at the bilateral mono­
poly situation. Two conclusions which may be drawn from the model 
are:
(1) Collective bargaining is more than just a question of 
wages and working conditions and
(2) The veto power of unions via strike action brings into
2 8question the entire theory of the firm.
Comments on Utility Models
As stated earlier, the intent of the preceding is to expose 
the reader to the type of models available in a specific category.
These are prototypical of the class of models they represent. Other
29 30 31utility based models may be found by Bishop, Raiffa, Hicks,
28Ibid., p. 27. Heckathorn, Douglas, "A Paradigm for Bar­
gaining and a Test of Two Bargaining Models," Behavioral Science 
(March 1978), Vol. 23, No. 2, gives an interesting discourse and test 
of the Smorordinsky-Kalai model in contrast to the more popular Nash 
model. See also Daniel Druckman and Thomas Bonoma, "Determinants of 
Bargaining Behavior in a Bilateral Monopoly Situation II: Opponent's
Concession Rate and Similarity," Behavioral Science, (1976), Vol. 21, 
pp. 252-262, for more extensive empirical testing.
29Robert L. Bishop, "A Zeuthen-Hicks Theory of Bargaining," 
Econometrica, Vol. 32, (July 1964), p. 410-417.
30Howard Raiffa, "Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two- 
Person Games," in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions 
to the Theory of Games, II, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1953.
31Johri R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, 2nd ed., MacMillan 
Company, London, 1963.
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Pen,"^ Edgeworth,^ Foldes,^4 Rapoport,^ and Von N e u m a n n , t o  name
a few. Unfortunately as Leap summarizes in his paper, several key
37points must be kept in mind when using utility based models.
(1) Individuals may have utility functions if they meet 
the conditions listed in footnote.38 it is highly 
unlikely that a group utility function exists which 
meets these conditions. Hence, anything purported
to be a group utility function is likely to be discon­
tinuous and not amenable to the mathematical manipulations 
(especially where the calculus is involved) of the
bargaining theories cited in this paper.
(2) Measurement problems will make it difficult to assess
an individuals' utility function in many instances.
This is most true when noneconomic issues are involved.
(3) Utility functions may change over time. This must be
incorporated into the dynamic theories of the bargaining 
process if they are to remain viable. It would also 
appear that a concession on one item (for example, an 
additional holiday) would alter the utility of another 
item (for example, wages).
32Jan Pen, "A General Theory of Bargaining," American Economic 
Review, (March 1952), Vol. 42, pp. 24-42.
33Alan Coddington, Theories of the Bargaining Process, Aldine 
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1968,
34 nLucien Foldes, "A Determinate Model of Bilateral Monopoly,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August 1947), Vol. 61, pp. 503-532.
35Rapoport, ojp. cit. , p. 2.
36Von Neumann and Morgenstern, op. cit.
37Leap, op cit., p. 15.
38Ibid., p. 13. Leap lists certain conditions which must be 
satisfied by individual preferences in order for these preferences 
to be representable by a utility function. (1) An individual's pre­
ferences must be completely ordered and transitive; (2) the individual 
must be aware of all alternatives available to him; (3) the individu­
al's preferences must be continuous such that no "gaps" exist in 
his field of choice.
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(4) A bargaining theory must make clear as to what type of 
utility function it is incorporating. There are two 
types of utility functions: cardinal and ordinal.
The cardinal utility function stipulates that if one 
item has a utility value of 5 while the second item, 
has a utility value of 10, then the second item is 
twice as preferred as the first. The ordinal utility 
function assigns utility numbers to items, but there 
are no weights given to the utility numbers. An 
example of an ordinal ranking would be the case of 
the football polls which rank college teams.
In addition to Leap's cautions, there is the problem that
39 40the models themselves do not accurately mirror reality. ’ Nash's
model will never produce a strike if the proponents act rationally. 
However, strikes exist and one cannot always conclude union or manage­
ment acted rationally. Furthermore, the quantitative models tend to 
be static focusing primarily on the wage related issues. Bargaining 
itself is a process over which a number of items not directly related 
to wages are considered.
Economic Models - Other
An example of a non-utility theory model (it might be argued
that all economic models are at least implicitly utility based) is one
41developed by Farber. The basic model examines its present value
39Ibid., p. 20.
40Sidney Siegel, Alberta E. Siegel and Julia M. Andrews, 
Choice, Strategy, and Utility, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York. 
1964, pp. 165-167.
^Henry S. Farber, "Bargaining Theory, Wage Outcomes, and 
the Occurrence of Strikes: An Econometric Analysis," American
Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 262-271.
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in terms of the trade-off between the demanded wage increases and 
the length of a strike.
The shape of this trade-off is determined by a "concession 
schedule" which denotes the minimum wage increase acceptable 
to the union rank and file after a strike of a given length. 
This schedule has a negative slope, reflecting the rate at 
which the rank and file reduce their expectations of a wage 
increase in response to hardships imposed on them by a strike 
and to "new" information learned from a strike about the 
degree of employer resistance to union wage demands. In 
simple terms, they become willing to settle for less as the 
strike progresses. The role of the union leadership is to 
convey to the management the shape of the concession schedule 
as well as to provide information to the rank and file regard­
ing feasible wage d e m a n d s . ^2 [see Figure 5]
FIGURE 5
CONCESSION SCHEDULE
Source: Henry S. Farber, "Bargaining Theory, Wage Outcomes, and
the Occurrence of Strikes: An Econometric Analysis,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 262-271.
42Ibid., p. 262.
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Other Mathematical Models 
43England presents a model of two-party negotiations using 
Markov chain analysis. Essentially the model is based on
.... the assumption that the pressures acting on a negotia­
tor differ for each input-mental state combination and that 
the pressures from any combination are constant over time; the 
negotiator is influenced only by the most recent input and by 
his mental state at the time of input. When earlier offers are 
recalled at all. they do not affect the negotiator's behavior 
significantly.
The major behavioral implication is that the negotiator acts 
as a "probabalistic automaton" which may explain some portion of 
behavior, but seems, excessively restrictive in the total view of 
the negotiator's behavior.
Comments on Mathematical Models
As a general statement the major problem with most of the
45mathematical models is their restrictive assumptions. While 
mathematics quite regularly affords one the ability to simply 
describe complex situations and test those descriptions without 
damaging the real world system, it is not without its limitations. 
Epistemologically, mathematics is a language, and one's ability to 
develop extensive models is a function of the language itself. Thus
43J. Lynn England, "Mathematical Models of Two-Party Nego­
tiations," Behavioral Science, (1973), Vol. 18, pp. 189-197.
44Ibid., p. 190.
^W. Buckley, T. Burns, and L.D. Meeker, "Structural Resolu­
tions of Collective Action Problems," Behavioral Science, Vol. 19, 
(1974), pp. 296.
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each branch of mathematics has fundamental limits beyond which no 
increase in its number of variables will increase the knowledge 
gained. Furthermore, mathematics as a language has limits beyond 
which we cannot go (Godels' Theorem). This is not to say that 
researchers are even close to the limits, but rather that other 
forms of construals may be needed. Or perhaps, the union of several 
languages is needed.
Verbal Bargaining Models
In direct contrast to the foregoing, verbal models attempt
to cover the entire spectrum of the bargaining process. The verbal
models have been divided into five general types; a) Process, b)
46Stages, c) Forces, d) Limits and e) All Others. Unlike their 
mathematical counterparts they do not yield deterministic results, 
except where they include a mathematical model of say wage settle­
ment in their description.
Process Models
Walton and McKersie Model - Walton and McKersie have developed what 
might be called the most comprehensive overall descriptive model of
46This typology developed through discussions with Dr.
Terence A. Oliva.
47Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral 
Theory of Labor Negotiations, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York , 
1965. Peterson and Tracy use empirical evidence in attempting to 
integrate the subprocesses, Richard Peterson and Lane Tracy,
"Testing a Behavioral Theory Model of Labor Negotiations," Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1, (February 1977), pp. 35-50. For an 
empirical study of subprocess four, see Charles Odewahn and Joseph
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the bargaining process. In some ways it may be viewed as four 
distinct models (subprocesses) which focus on different aspects of 
the bargaining situation.
(1) Distributive bargaining - deals with the conflicts 
arising over the allocation of scarce resources. Specifically, 
union-management differences over wages, hours, working conditions 
and the like.
(2) Integrative bargaining - deals with joint problem solving. 
This may result in both sides being able to divide a larger portion
of the added rewards. Unlike conflict-oriented behavior, integrative 
bargaining may require a concessionary attitude.
(3) Attitudinal Structuring model - deals with the structure 
of the attitudes of the bargaining parties. This results from the 
fact that human beings are an integral part of the bargaining process. 
Thus, psychological tactics and sociological ideologies become a 
major component in labor negotiations.
(4) Intraorganizational bargaining - deals with the internal 
conflict of each of the bargaining parties. Normally, neither 
management nor unions have an internal consensus. Ideas on what 
should be done, or what strategy should be used in the negotiations 
regularly differ.
What makes the Walton and McKersie model effective in 
describing the overall bargaining process is that each subprocess
Krislon, "Contrast Rejections: Testing the Explanatory Hypotheses,"
Industrial Relations, (October 1973), Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 292-3.
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model is itself a full scale model. The distribution model, for 
example, includes game theory, utility functions, the wage spectrum, 
and subjectively expected utilities as well as a detailed section on 
strategies and tactics of the model.
Other subprocess models integrate frameworks such as balance 
theory, reinforcement theory, and role-conflict resolution. In 
many ways, Walton and McKersie have the essence of a complete bar­
gaining model. That is, the overlap of the four subprocesses forms 
the entire model, much in the same way that intersecting sets do 
in a Venn diagram. Unfortunately, the subprocesses do not fit 
together as well as they might, and only the distributive bargaining 
portion yields the advantages found in quantitative analysis. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to "operate" the model. It is 
functionally weak in an operational sense, since one cannot use it 
directly in the real world.^
Stages Models
Stages models may be viewed as a kind of process model where 
the process is sequential. Walton and McKersie's subprocesses are 
intertwined and interactive. The models which follow are strictly 
sequential.
Peterson and Tracy, og_. cit. , pp. 35-50.
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The AMA Basic Process Model Structure ~
1. Advance Preparation
a. Advance Notice of Contract Termination
b. Management Review
c. Contract Language
d. Retaining Control of Managements' Function
(1) positive approach
(2) negative approach
e. Defining Managements' Rights
f. Clauses Curtailing Managements' Freedom to Operate
(1) union shop
(2) management rights clause
(3) seniority







(1) hot cargo or struck work clauses
(2) picket line clauses
(3) mutual-consent clauses
(4) guaranteed-wage or hours clause
(5) automatic-wage progressions beyond base rate
(6) policing of the agreement by the union
(7) all-inclusive benefits (catch-all) clauses
2. Facts Required for Bargaining
a. Company Policies




3. Contract Termination Notice
a. Notice to Terminate or Modify (Taft-Hartley Act)
b. Company Initial Notice
c. When Notice is not Timely
4. Reviewing the Union Proposals
a. An Initial contract
b. Contract Termination or Modification
49Elizabeth Martinez, Understanding Collective Bargaining, 







The Douglas Stages Model‘S  -
1. The first stage (establishing the negotiating range) 
consists of a 'thorough and exhaustive determination' 
if the range within which the parties will have to do 
business with each other.
2. In the second stage (reconnoitering the negotiating 
range) negotiations attempt to 'convey without com­
mitment. [That is,] negotiators research earnestly 
in the background for signs of tacit agreement, long 
before in their public exchange they can afford to 
profess anything but continued strong disagreement.’
3. In the third and final stage (precipating the decision­
making crisis) a decision-making crisis is reached,
in which negotiators must consult with their respective 
parties, and, if possible, conclude an agreement.
The Douglas model is essentially homomorphic to the AMA model 
or for that matter, any of the sequential procedures oriented repre­
sentations of the bargaining process. Such time frame models are 
linear and tend to miss the nonsequential aspects of the process such 
as are accounted for by a Walton and McKersie type model.
Interactive Forces Model
Interactive forces model are similar to the process models 
in that they overlap in time. They are unlike process models in 
that they are usually made up of univariate force units.
Morley and Stephenson, ojd. cit. , p. 38.
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51The Weber Model - Weber views bargaining as a set of four inter­
active elements shown below:
1. Size (number of members) of the bargaining unit
2. Scope (extent as to number of issues and levels of 
workforce involved)
3. Distribution of decision-making power
4. Relationships between bargaining units
The interaction of the forces developed from these elements 
form the basic bargaining structure. As the elements vary along 
their respective continuum the structure changes. If one arbitrarily 
chooses scales for the above elements, then it is easier to con­
ceptualize the process (see Table I) .
TABLE I
POSSIBLE DIMENSIONS OF BARGAINING ELEMENTS
1 Size small <------------- > large
2 Scope limited c------------- > extended
3 Decision-Making none c------------- > absolute
4 Relat ionship conf1ict c-------------— > cooperation
As one selects different combinations from the scales, dif­
ferent bargaining structures emerge. For example compare:
^^Weber, oj). cit. , pp. 18-19.
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Obviously, the bargaining process would vary considerably in the 
two different situations. The model, thus, does seem to have some 
face validity.
52McGrath's Tripolar Model - McGrath's model examines three forces 
which affect the opposing leaders of the two bargaining parties:
(1) R-forces - focus on the given position the negotiator
has relative to his group, and include his 
attitudinal identification and representative 
obligations.
(2) A-forces - focus on the negotiator's view of the opposing
party's position.
(3) C-forces - focus on the situation of the larger organiza­
tion in which the parties exist.
Negotiation is a function of the interplay of the forces, 
just as in the preceding model. Unlike the previous model, however,
Morley and Stephenson, op.cit., p. 28. E. Allen Slusher 
"Counterpart Strategy, Prior Relations, and Constituent Pressure in 
a Bargaining Simulation," Behavioral Science, (1978), Vol. 23, pp. 
470-477, attempts to empirically test "counterpart strategy" and 
"constituent pressure" which are quite similar to A-forces and 
R-forces respectively.
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the tripolar model is primarily psychologically based and focuses 
on the individuals more than the structure of the situation.
Limits Models
Limits models generally are based on Pigou's range of inde- 
53terminateness. Essentially this model implies that wages will not
necessarily meet the theoretic economic optimum; but, rather, will
fall within some range, such that management's maximum offer is
greater than the union's minimum acceptable level. The larger the
overlap, the greater the area of bargaining. If no overlap occurs,
there is no opportunity for bargaining to occur and conflict is
inevitable. Obviously, both bargaining skill and bargaining
strength determine where final settlement points will be. Variants
54of this conceptualization appear in many other models.
A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, Second Edition, 
MacMillan and Company Ltc., London, 1924.
54R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union Management 
Relations, Belmont, California, Wadsworth, Inc., 1965, pp. 90-96. 
Similar description of bargaining behavior as a function of behavioral 
variables may be found in S.H. Slichter, J.J. Healy, and E.R. Liver- 
nash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management, Washington, 
D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1960; R.E. Walton and R.B. McKersie, 
op. cit.; Randle and Wortman, op. cit., H.M. Levinson, Determining 
Forces in Collective Bargaining, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1966; L.C. Megginson and C.R. Gullet, "A Predictive Model of Union- 
Management Conflict," Personnel Journal (June 1970); J.B. Miner, Per- 
sonnel and Industrial Relations: A Managerial Approach, New York,
MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1973; F.H. Cassel and J.J. Baron, Collective 
Bargaining in the Public Sector, Columbus, Grid Inc., 1975; S.W. 
Gillerman, Managers and Subordinates, Hinsdale, Illinois, the Dryden 
Press, 1976; and L.C. Megginson, Personnel and Human Resources Admini­
stration, Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977, T.A.
Kochan and H.N. Wheeler, "Municipal Collective Bargaining: A Model
and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes," Industrial and Labor Relations
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Randle/Wortman's Graphic Interpretation of Pigou's Model
For the model below (see Figure 6) there are five different 
issues. In Issue I, the bargaining limits of both labor and 
management are identical. The parties are therefore in 
virtual agreement at the beginning. Settlement can be made 
anywhere between the two limits OF' and FO’. More specifically, 
suppose that labor expects to make an original demand for a 
40 cents an hour increase, but will settle for no less than
10 cents an hour. Under these conditions O' = 40 cents and
F' = 10 cents. On the other hand, management originally 
expects to offer 10 cents an hour, but will not go beyond 
40 cents an hour. Then 0 = 10 cents and F = 40 cents an
hour. Then 0 = 10 cents and F = 40 cents. Agreement will
thus be consummated for a wage increase somewhere between 
10 cents and 40 cents an hour. The relative bargaining 
strengths will determine the exact amount. If management 
has the greatest bargaining persuasiveness and economic 
power, the agreement will be closer to 10 cents. If 
labor is stronger in negotiations, the agreement will be 
closer to 40 cents.
This example may be followed through for the other 
issues. In Issue II, agreement will still be easy, for 
the area of agreement (F'F) is large. There now appears 
two areas, however, in which no agreement is possible 
because they are beyond the overlapping bargaining limits 
of the parties. These are OF' and FO'. Generally as 
F'F shrinks and OF' and FO' grow larger, agreement becomes 
more and more difficult. In Issue III, the area of agree­
ment is much smaller and agreement will be more difficult, 
coming only after lengthy sessions and much negotiation.
In Issue IV, the outer bargaining limits of labor and manage­
ment coincide. The only possible area of agreement is the 
line FF'. In terms of the first example, labor will take no 
less than 40 cents an hour and management will offer no more 
than 40 cents. To reach agreement will be exceedingly dif­
ficult. Perhaps it will come only after long hours of 
proposal and counter-proposal and threats of direct economic 
sanction. Mediation may be employed. If the parties per­
severe, however, settlement will finally be made at 40
Review, (October 1975), Vol. 20; and P.F. Gerhart, "Determinants 
of Bargaining Outcomes in Local Government Labor Negotiations," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (April 1976), Vol. 29.
■^Randle and Wortman, oj>. cit. , pp. 188-190.
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0 = original management position O' = original labor position
F = final management position F' ■= final labor position
OF = bargaining limits of management O'F' = bargaining limits of labo
□  = area of bargaining agreement 
Source: Randle and Wortman, oja. cit. , p. 189.
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cents per hour. In Issue V, the bargaining limits of labor 
and management do not overlap. This means that under normal 
bargaining a deadlock will ensue.
Stagner and Rosen~^ - Stagner and Rosen developed a model based on 
Pigou's formulation.
Both parties bring certain expectations to the negotia­
tions. It is general practice for each group to write its 
own expectations into proposals for the new contract... 
Similarly, each side is likely to have, at the beginning 
of negotiations, an idea of the limit beyond which it will 
make no concessions. This limit results in a bargaining 
zone for each side, with the preferred solution on one end 
and the tolerance limit on the other... As the parties 
bargain, they explore these limits and, hopefully, find an 
area in which a compromise is possible. For both sides, 
the-e is a bargaining zone between the employer’s tolerance 
limit and the union's tolerance limit... Each side can 
always find some instances to support the "wished for" 
solution; and each side will tend to ignore the evidence 
presented by the opposition. Nevertheless, communication 
does take place; each takes cognizance of the data, and the 
acceptability shifts. Management moves up a little, and 
the union moves down a little, until an acceptable point 
for both is reached.^
The above can be diagrammed as shown in Figure 7. An implication is 
that when one or the other party's tolerance limits are exceeded, 
a strike or lockout will occur. In addition, neither party is 
aware of the opposing party's tolerance limits or desired solution.
"’^ S t a g n e r  ancj Rosen, op. cit. , pp. 90-96. 
^Ibid ., p . 93.
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FIGURE 7


















Source: Adapted from R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union
Management Relations, Wadsworth, Inc., Belmont, Calif., 
1965, pp. 90-96.
Comments on the Theoretical Models
No attempt has been made to examine all the theoretically 
based models of collective bargaining. Rather, the attempt was to 
look at examples of the major types as they are essentially iso­
morphic within a class. Looking at the models discussed above, one 
can represent them for structural analysis as follows:
FIGURE 8




The structural breakdown allows one to examine a model's
characteristics apart from its basic language. Notice that in this
form it is easier to remember that the models are simply construals
of the various systems they represent which is, in this case, the
bargaining process. From the generic diagram the essential logic
structure of the construct is evident, as well as the other types
of languages which might be used with the various models.
For example, the process model suggests a Venn diagram type of
analysis may be of aid. Similarly, the forces model implies that
5 8vector analysis could be appropriate. Furthermore, the models sug­
gest possible model gaps. Take as an example the model which is being 




From a mathematical view these models may be all described 
in set theoretic terms. However, this may result in too much 
abstraction.
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or more accurately as three, two-space sets as shown in Figure 10
(a), (b) and (c).
FIGURE 10
QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE CUSP MODEL
The point is that one can see immediately that the nature of 
the proposed model is structurally different from any of the others 
proposed. Consequently, a substantial departure is easily recog­
nized. Furthermore, it should be more apparent at this point as to 
why interest was focused on major model types rather than a defini­
tive listing of all models.
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Empirical Validation of Models
Various attempts have been made to test the aforementioned
■ 1 1  . . i 59 ,  60 ,  61,  62,  63,  64 ,  65 T , ,models empirically. It can be argued
that empirical designs in themselves are models of bargaining
behavior. However, as far as this study is concerned, they will
simply be treated as experimental designs used to test a given
theoretical model. The rationale for this is that if one uses
the scientific method, one cannot divorce the theoretical from
the empirical and have any hope of generating a meaningful and
useable model.
Since direct data gathered from management and union nego­
tiations is at most limited to the results or outcomes of the 
bargaining session, most researchers have been forced to move to 
game oriented laboratory experiments to develop data. While no 
agreed upon set of terminology exists for the game typology, the one 
by Morley and Stephenson will be used.^^
59Fouracker and Siegel, op>. cit.
60 R a i f f a ,  o p .  c i t .
GinRapoport, ojp. cit.
6 2Morley and Stephenson, o£. cit.
63Levinson, 0 £. cit.
64 Seigel, Siegel and Andrews, oji. cit.
^For a brief discussion of the problems and lack of testing
see Heckathorn, o£. cit 
66.Morley and Stephenson, op_. cit.
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Experimental Bargaining Models :
(1) Matrix Games
(2) Distribution Games
(3) Economic Exchange Games
(4) Role-playing Games
(5) Substitute Debate Games
Matrix games are of the form shown in the figure below:
FIGURE 11
MATRIX GAME
B 1 B 2
A 1 V  PB
A 2
where player A's strategies are and B's are B^, B^, and their
respective payoffs are P., P . Games represent the tradeoff/conflictA  D
situation quite well and consequently are appropriate in tradeoff 
type models such as those that are utility based. However, according 
to Morley and Stephenson: "abstract games of this sort (whether
matrix games or mechanical games) do not simulate bargaining situa-
• i i . . ! I 8  7tions at all, even very simple ones.
6 7Ibid., p. 48. See also Allen E. Slusher, oj>. cit., p. 471.
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Distribution games do include a negotiation process. Gener­
ally the task is to meet some minimal goal, say a number of points 
or amount of money. Usually, each party is unaware of his opponent's 
goals and can get more points or money if he gets more than his 
minimum. The major problem is the tendency for such games to exert 
excessive time pressure and severely restrict all communication.
Economic games use sets of profits tables for each side such 
that they are to agree on a price/quantity exchange. Usually some 
of the outcomes maximize the joint gains available (i.e., Pareto 
Optimal) while others do not. In a sense economic games and distri­
bution games are similar in nature with the exception that the 
economic games are more realistic.
Role playing games are realistic simulations which require
the participants to accomplish a set of collective bargaining tasks
68that mirrors those found in the real world. The problem has 
become one of measurement and the role identification of the 
participants.
Substitute debate games employ real negotiators with bona 
fide issues of interest to both parties in a laboratory setting with 
discussion oriented tasks. As might be suspected, it is difficult 
to get a sufficient number of negotiators and issues to conduct 
the experiments with any reasonable amount of replication. Examples 












Siegel and Fouracker 1960
Campbell 1960
McGrath and Julian 1963
Morley and Stephenson have made a comparison of the various type of 
experimental models which examine their essential features. (see 
Table 2)
Notice that there is an implicit ranking of the appropriate­
ness of the experimental games as one moves to the right in the 
table from matrix to substitute games. Of particular interest is 
that next to using real negotiators, role-playing games are the 
best. This fact has direct bearing on the test of the model in this 
study.
Catastrophe Theory: An Overview
69Rene Thom developed a new mathematical modelling technique 
known as catastrophe theory. The underlying mathematics of the 
theory is differential topology and requires a somewhat extensive 
background in mathematics. Fortunately, the dynamicism of the
69Rene Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, New York, 
W.A. Benjamin, Inc., 1975.
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL MODELS
Essential Features
1. Type of simulation
2. Communication possibilities
3. Amount of information about 
other profits
4. Sequence of choice
















































According to Chara- 
teristics of profit 
tables and 
' scenario'
Source: Ian Morley and Geoffrey Stephenson, The Social Psychology of Bargaining, George Allen & Unvin, Ltd., London, 197/, p. 45.
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resulting model (catastrophe surface) can be fairly easily understood
without referring to topology, primarily due to the work of Zeeman,
who has popularized the theory with his now famous, though somewhat
controversial Scientific American^  article. More recently, most of
Zeeman's work has been collected in a work titled Catastrophe
71Theory: Selected Papers 1972-1977 and the entire September, 1978
issue of Behavioral Science was devoted to catastrophe theory.
The value of catastrophe theory is that until recently in the 
social sciences
... (p)henomenon involving sudden large variations traditionally 
have been assumed to be outside the reach of mathematical treat­
ment, because they lacked what was considered to be an essential 
precondition, the continuity of the dependence relation between 
the variables...
There is also a related phenomenon of 'divergence,' when 
discontinuity may occur with respect to a variable other than 
time. For example, sharp division of opinion can emerge in a 
population gradually and smoothly ...
... catastrophe theory has now reached that sudden change 
and divergencies are not only rational, and inevitable, but also 
amenable to rigorous mathematical treatment.72
73Consider Zeeman's example of fear and rage in a dog.
E. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory," Scientific American,
(April 1976), pp. 65-83.
^E. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers 1972-1977,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977.
72E. Zeeman and C.A. Isnard, "Some Models in the Social 
Sciences," Selected Papers 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Co., Reading, Mass., 1977, pp. 303-304.
73E. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers, 1972-1977,
op. cit., p . 5.
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... assume we can devise some vertical scale x representing 
the resulting behavior of the dog running from fight to 
flight, through intermediary behavior such as growling, 
neutral, and avoiding. We want to plot the graph x as 
a function of a and 3 . It is true, ..., that an increase 
in rage causes an increase in aggression, an increase in 
fear causes a decrease in aggression.
But what if we increase both rage and fear together?
The least likely behavior is for the dog to remain neutral, 
and the most likely behavior is fight or flight, although 
which of the two we choose may be unpredictable. Therefore 
one thing is sure: there is no simple formula like
x = a - 3 ...
How do we analyze the situation? One answer is to look 
at the likelihood. So let us imagine a likelihood distri­
bution for the behavior x in each of the following four 
cases (see Figure 12) .
FIGURE 12
LIKELIHOOD OF AGGRESSION BEHAVIOR














E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers 1972-1977,












Zeeman , Catast. rophe Theory: 'hole ct ed Paper s ,_19 72-197 7 , op. cit.
Ln<X>
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The interesting case is Case 4, where the distribution 
has gone bimodel... What catastrophe theory tells us is that if 
the likelihood distribution looks like Figure 12, then the 
graph will look like Figure 13. ̂ 4
Zeeman argues that in mathematical structure, where pro­
perties depend on the notions of order and topological structure, 
the results are called qualitative, while those resting on algebraic 
structures are called quantitative.^5
What catastrophe theory offers is the ability to model a 
qualitative aspect of the social system. One has to be somewhat 
cautious in that Zeeman's definition of qualitative follows a mathe­
matical set of ideas. For example, in the figures below, the 
curves are qualitatively equal though quantitatively different.
FIGURE 14 
QUALITATIVELY EQUAL CURVES
Zeeman, E.C. "Catastrophe Theory: Draft for a Scientific 
American Article," Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Pub­
lishing Co., Reading'Mass., 1977, p. 5.
75Ibid., 319-321.
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That is, what can be said from a qualitative aspect is that
7 6they are both increasing, smooth, and single valued. The dif­
ference may simply be due to scaling procedures. This is different 
from the situation in the physical sciences where, for example, choice
of scales in temperature measures has linear results under the same
77conditions no matter what. According to Zeeman, then, what cata­
strophe theory adds in the social sciences is the qualitative
7 8concepts of: divergence, catastrophic change, fold point, etc.
The response surface generated is peculiar in that it has a
fold in it; however, it is this fold that gives the model its ability
to describe divergent and noncontinuous aspects of behavior. Since 
the real world is supposed to be a 4-dimensional space-time continuum, 
Thom has identified what are called the seven elementary catastrophes 
which allow one to model in from one to four dimensional space. The 
basic equations are shown in Table 3 below.
Of particular interest to this study is the cusp model which 
relates two control variables to one behavior variable (see Figure 13).
f(a,b,x) = 1/4 -it - ax - 1 / 2  bx^
3f n 3  u7—  = 0  = x - a - b x
Zeeman and Isnard, 0 £. cit., p. 322.
7 7 Ibid., p. 322.
7 8Ibid., p . 324 .
TABLE 3
BASIC EQUATIONS OF SEVEN ELEMENTARY CATASTROPHES
dim x dim c




Umbilics Hyperbolic 2 3
Elliptic 2 3
Parabolic 2 4
 _________ Function f____________
1/ 3 x^ -• ax ?
1/4 x^ - ax - 1/2 bx“
1/5 x - ax - 1/2 bx 2  - l/3 cx
1/6 x - ax - 1/2 bx^ - l/3cx - l/4 dx
3 3x^ + y + ax + by + cxv  ̂ 2
x„ - xy + ax + by + c (x + y )A ” 0  /x y + y + ax + by + cx^ + dy-
Source: E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theorv: Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977, p. 27.
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For a situation to be suitable for description by the cusp 
catastrophe, five conditions are requisite:
1 . bimodality




Figure 15 shows how the five conditions are related to one 
another by the model. It should be apparent from the diagram that, 
as stated above, the fold is the focal point of the model. Examining 
each condition in the abstract, we can observe the general dynamics 
of the model.
Bimodality is represented bv the top and bottom portion of
the fold. It represents the domain where given combinations of the
system control variables can result in different types of behavior
(i.e., the system is multi varied). The projection of the boundaries
of this region onto the control surface (ab-plane) form a cusp (called
80the bifurcation set) which delimits the bimodal region. Within 
this region two different types of system behaviors are possible 
from a given set of control variables. Ultimately, the determination
79E.C. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory: Draft for a Scientific
American Article," 0 £. cit., p. 18.
80Brian R. Flay, "Catastrophe Theory in Social Psychology:
Some Applications to Attitudes and Social Behavior," Behavioral 
Science, Vol. 23, No. 5, Sept. 1978; Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: 
Selected Papers 1972-1977, op. cit.
FIGURE 15
FIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR A CUSP CATASTROPHE
Source:
Divergence






of behavior in this region is made by examining the prior position 
of the system, i.e., the system's history.
Sudden transitions (catastrophes) are accounted for at the 
edges of the fold. That is, as the system moves along the surface 
toward the pleat, at some point a small increase in the control 
variable will cause a sudden shift in behavior —  a transition to 
the other surface. To use Zeeman's example, if an angry dog is made 
more fearful, at some point this behavior will abruptly change from 
attack to retreat; conversely, if a fearful dog is progressively 
enraged, at some point it will stop retreating, turn and attack.










2 . 0 0 3 -1 . 0 0
2 . 0 0 3 2 . 0 0
18.00 3 3.00
The fact that catastrophes do not occur at the same place 
but depend on the prior state of the system, incorporates lags into 
the model which match certain real-world phenomena. If one follows 
the trajectories of lines A and B on the surface, over the same
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control values —  one notices that the sudden transitions occur in 
different places. For example, if a person starts out "in love" and 
is made to increasingly dislike another, the complete change-over to 
hate will not occur at the same point as a person who starts out dis­
liking another. Simply, a person in love endures more grief from a 
second individual than does one who starts out disliking the 
individual; obviously, the reverse is true. In terms of the model, 
movement coming from one direction precipitates a catastrophe in a 
different place than does movement from a different direction. This 
lag is called hysteresis.
The middle sheet of the fold represents the inaccessible area 
which is that of least likely behavior (remember the response surface 
is the set of maximums and minimums). In a love/hate situation, this 
might be its state of neutrality, non-emotion, or apathy. To see 
why it is inaccessible, one can simply move a pencil across the model. 
Upon reaching a fold edge, one either falls down to the bottom surface 
or up to the top. Examining the numbers in the preceding table, one 
can see that the jump occurs at (a, b, x: a=2, b=3, x=-l and x=2).
Divergent behavior is accounted for since as one moves out 
from the edge toward the singularity, which is the starting point 
of separation between the two surfaces; small changes in the indepen­
dent variables will cause the system to exhibit different types of
8  Jdivergent behavior such as flight or attack, or love or hate. The 
81E.C. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory: Draft for a Scientific
American Article," op. cit.
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trajectory followed will depend on the values of the independent 
variable (the state of the system), just prior to reaching the 
singularity.
Zeeman uses a device called a catastrophe machine to explain
8 2the dynamics of the model. What follows is a restatement in more 
descriptive terms.
In Figure 16 below, there are two graphs which correspond to 
the areas of catastrophe surfaces. Graph (a) shows that the surfaces 
outside the bifurcation set are minima and represent the single sheet
FIGURE 16 
GRAPHS OF MINIMA AND MAXIMA POINTS
(a) (b)
82Ibid., p. 10-11.
points, while graph (b) represents minima and maxima (open dot) 
within the bifurcation set. If a point were to move along the 




Source: E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers 1972-1977,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977,
p. 1 1 .
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As the point moves along the surface it eventually crosses into the
bifurcation set and a new minimum and maximum appear as shown in
(b), but nothing happens in terms of the choice of surface. Upon
crossing the center of the bifurcation set, the original minimum
starts to break down and the second minimum continues to deepen (d).
Eventually, the first minimum "shrinks" to the level of the maximum
(i.e., breakdown completely), and a jump occurs to the second minimum
(other surface) at the point it leaves the bifurcation set (set e).
The point then continues along the other surface. Notice that if the
process is reversed, then the shift to the original surface does not
occur at (e) but rather at (b) .
As stated above, the most common form of the surface presented
8  3in the literature is that given by Zeeman. Recognizing that there 
are a variety of other formulations possible, for illustrative pur­
poses, the Zeeman formulation will be used to develop important 
related equations.
x^ - a - bx = 0  (1 )
The equation of the singularity set being its first partial derivation 
of (1 ) with respect to x or:
83Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory: Selected Papers 1972-1977,
op. cit.; Flay, o£. cit.; Leonard Starobin, "Our Changing Evolution: 
Strategies for 1980," General Systems Yearbook, Anatol Rapoport (ed.) 
Vol. XXI, 1976, pp. 3-46.
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3f „ 2  . .
^  " 3x - b <2)
To develop an equation of the projection of the set of singularities 
in the control parameter plane (the ab plane) one solves equation (2 ) 
in terms of b and substitutes back in equation (1) to get equation (3)
27a2 = Ab3  (3)
Notice in the figures that the ’b ' variable bisects the bifurcation
set. In fact for positive values of *b ', the surface splits, and,
as 'b' increases, the amount of the split increases. For this
reason, when the control variable axes are perpendicular to the cusp,
the terms normal factor and splitting factor are used to describe 'a'
84and 'b' respectively. When the control factors lie on either side
8  5of the cusp, they are called conflicting factors. See Figure 18 
and 19. Examples of the kinds of phenomena modelled by the cusp are 
given in Table 4 below.
While catastrophe theory has been heralded as a 'fantastic' 
aid to modelling in the social sciences, it is not without its
E.C. Zeeman, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory," Mani­
folds Tokyo 1973, Akio Hattori (ed.) University of Tokyo Press, 
Tokyo, 1975.
85 i b i d .
FIGURE 18 FIGURE 19
NORMAL AND SPLITTING FACTORS CONFLICTING FACTORS
Source: E.C. Zeeman, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory," Mani­
folds Tokyo 1973, Akio Hattori (ed.) University of Tokyo 
Press, Tokyo, 1.976.
critics (Sussman^ and Kolata^) . Probably the most effective 
criticisms have been those leveled at catastrophe theory by Sussman 
and Zahler.
There is no doubt as to the accuracy and/or propriety of 
their criticisms. Unfortunately, they may have gone too far in 
suggesting that Zeeman is tautological and that catastrophe theory
^Hector J. Sussman and Raphael S. Zahler, "A Critique of 
Applies Catastrophe Theory in the Behavioral Science," Behavior 
Science, Vol. 23, No. 5, (Sept. 1978), pp. 383-389.
87G.B. Kolata, "Catastrophe Theory: The Emperor Has No
Clothes." Science (April 1977).
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has nothing really new to offer. In part, the clash seems to be 
symptomatic of the traditional battle between purist and pragmatist 
(or theoretician and empiricist). At one extreme the purist looks 
for truth apart from reality, while at the other extreme the prag­
matist looks for reality apart from truth.
Sussman and Zahler seem to have gone beyond a constructive
role to a destructive role. Their most damaging attack occurs on
88page 387 and is repeated below:
(1) Every surface can be approximated arbitrarily closely 
by a surface in S.
(2) The surfaces in £ are nonrigid in the following sense: 
If S is in £ and if U and V are disjoint regions in 
space, and T is an arbitrary surface in V, then there 
are surfaces S' and £ that are arbitrarily close to
T and V, while coinciding with S on U .
(3) If F is any finite set of points whatsoever, then 
there is a surface in £ that passes through all points 
in F.
Property (1) implies that, for an experimenter, 
there is no way to test the hypotheses that a surface 
is in £. Indeed, all observations have an error.
88 Sussman and Zahler, oj). cit. , p. 387.
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Therefore, any arbitrary surface S is observationally 
indistinguishable from some surface S' in E . (Take 
S' to be a surface in E that approximates S to within 
a distance smaller than the error). Property (3) says 
that any set of observations is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the set of possible states is a surface 
in E .
Finally, property (2) asserts that a knowledge 
of the surface in some region says nothing whatsoever 
about the surface in any other region.
What the preceding remarks amount to is the 
following very simple conclusion: If we wish to describe
systems that obey equilibrium equations, then Thom's 
theorem is not helpful. It is not much better than the 
tautologous statement that an equilibrium surface is a 
surface. Knowing that S is not just any surface, but 
a surface that satisfies the properties of Thom's 
theorem, gives very little extra information about S 
since the properties that occur in Thom's theorem are 
local.
Any social scientist reading the above comments would pro­
bably be strongly tempted to pass over catastrophe theory as a 
somewhat useless curiosity. However, this would be a mistake. Unlike 
the hard sciences, the behavioral scientist does not merely talk about 
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, she/he lives with it. Research
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in the behavioral sciences is nor neat and clean, it is messy with 
a lot of slippage. The mathematician, of course, can assume away 
problems. Specifically, a point is a dimensionless entity that 
is perfect. But points do not exist except in the minds of 
mathematicians. If the behavioralist needs to deal with a point 
empirically it is probably fuzzy, not symmetrical, and has dimension.
Furthermore, one cannot overlook a possible tool because 
it is not perfect in every way. In this regard, many of the stati­
stical techniques used in the behavioral sciences are subject to
the criticism through 3 above. And in using them we are not using,
89in Sussman's words, chicken soup to cure appendicitis if we 
recognize the limitations. Consider, for example, the much used 
(even overused) technique of regression analysis (this refers not 
just to linear regression but rather, the family of techniques). If 
one substitutes the term "the class of all regression surfaces" in 
the above quote for E, then in the main, Sussman and Zahler's com­
ments are equally damaging to that technique. This yields the 
following:
(1) There is no way to tell if the hypothetical surface 
is really a member of E, i.e., a regression surface.
(2) Knowledge of the surface in a given region says 
absolutely nothing about the surface in another
89Ibid., p . 386.
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region, hence, one regularly invokes the concept of 
a relevant range.
(3) Certainly any set of finite points can be fitted by a 
curve in 2 . In fact, this tends to be the classic
student error, e.g., ten observations, ten variables
2 r , and an R of 1.
Should one then throw out regression analysis? Or, should 
we recognize its weaknesses and apply it carefully? There is a 
tendency for the model developer to confuse the model with the 
system itself, thereby becoming overly committed to the construct.
All models are, at best, construals of the systems they attempt to 
represent. This suggests that many models may be appropriate for 
a given system, depending on the situation. Unfortunately, this 
obvious fact gets ignored when one runs into criticism of the type 
leveled by Sussman and Zahler.
Catastrophe theory is not useless to the behavioral sciences. 
At the same time, it is not magic either. And, perhaps, it is not 
catastrophe theory that is important to the behavioral scientist, 
but instead, the catastrophe surface. The single biggest contri­
bution of catastrophe theory to the behavioral sciences seems to 
be that it moves one away from single valued response surfaces. For 
years the richness found in many behavioral situations has been lost 
because they have been mapped down (assumed away) to single valued­
ness (which is very much akin to single mindedness). If catastrophe
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theory does nothing else, it may help to move the behavioral science 
into a new era of modelling, not because of some inherent truth in 
the theory, but through the realization that response surfaces do not 
have to be single valued and smooth.
CHAPTER III
PRESENTATION OF THE MODEL 
Introduction
If one were to arrange the theoretical models described 
earlier on a continuum from general to specific, they would tend 
to go from highly descriptive overviews of the entire process, to 
highly quantitative models of very specific aspects of bargaining 
such as optimal wage determination. However, as Boulding^ points
2out, the trade-off is general applicability for content. Oliva's 
concept of a maximal construal would say that the best model possible 
of collective bargaining would be the set of all construals of the 
bargaining process. The choice of a single model immediately causes 
the loss of some aspects of the process.
However, from a pragmatic viewpoint, one must work with 
single models or hybrids which integrate several models. Returning 
to the continuum discussed above, it should be noted that the quan­
titative models tend to be too restrictive while the verbal models 
are not restrictive enough. There needs to be models which can
‘'"Kenneth Boulding, "General Systems Theory —  The Skeleton
of Science," Management Science, (April 1956), Vol. 2, pp. 197-208.
2Terence A. Oliva, "Laszlo, Semantics and Systems Defini­
tions: A Critique," Behavioral Science, (May 1976), Vol. 21, No. 3,
pp. 196-199.
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describe the overall behavior of the bargaining system in such a 
way that the behavior can ultimately be explained, predicted, and 
controlled, and that tests of the model are replicable by other 
scientists. That is, there is a need for a descriptive (qualita­
tive) model that has the benefits of mathematical rigor. In 1977 
3
Oliva/Capdevielle made the first attempt at developing such a 
model. Using catastrophe theory, which purports to allow the inclu­
sion of qualitative factors with mathematical rigor, a model was
developed based on the limits type model mentioned earlier. In
4particular, the Stagner-Rosen formulation of the model was used.
Since 1977, the model has evolved to its present state.
The choice of a limits-type model was made for the following 
five reasons:
1. It is on the highly verbal end of the aforementioned 
scale.
2. It is a fairly clear overall representation of the 
bargaining process in general.
3. It allows for the representation of a variety of 
qualitative behaviors (such as strike, lockout, 
negotiation).
3
Terence A. Oliva and Christel M. Capdevielle, "Collective 
Bargaining as a Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of the Academy 
of Management, 1977, pp. 177-181.
4R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union-Management Rela­
tions , Belmont, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1965.
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4. It seems to most nearly fit all of the definitions of 
collective bargaining given in Chapter 2.
5. It is commonly used as a pedogogical tool in explaining 
the bargaining process.
In systems language, the model seems to be descriptively 
homomorphic and essentially isomorphic to the bargaining process.
A New Collective Bargaining Model
It is believed that the mapping of the Stagner-Rosen limits- 
type model onto the catastrophe surface is a major step in improving 
the Stagner and Rosen formulation, as well as developing a new and 
dynamically descriptive approach to collective bargaining. In addi­
tion to the two control variables of Stagner and Rosen, the mapping 
adds a third dimension, the behavior surface. Figure 20 represents 
the mapping of the model onto the cusp catastrophe model. Bargaining 
behavior of the negotiating system ranges from strike to lockout.
As a general characteristic, one may view the behavior on the two 
positions of the surface as strike-prone or lockout-prone. Remember 
the behavior being described is the negotiating system * s behavior not 
the behavior of the parties except as they integrate to form a 
single unit of behavior. (See Figure 21) For a situation to be 
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For this model, each of the criteria are discussed below.
The two independent variables are the management and union bargain­
ing intensities, and the bargaining behavior of the system ranges 
from strike to lockout. Bargaining intensities are not synonymous 
with a set of demands or issues, but rather a composite index of the 
participants' perceptions about issues such as wages, fringe benefits, 
hours of work, bargaining equity, emotions, etc.
Bimodality
Management and union tolerance limits set the boundaries of 
the bifurcation set. Within these boundaries, formal negotiations 
take place. The range of behavior, of course, includes all behavior 
such as formal, informal, and non-formal bargaining. Within the 
bifurcation set, two forms of behavior are possible (i.e., strike 
prone or lockout prone). The least likely behavior is that of 
neutrality because of the conflict nature of bargaining —  i.e., 
a distribution of fixed resources between two parties.
Once the boundaries are crossed, the behavior of the system 
becomes unimoda] and formal negotiations are not engaged in. This 
does not mean that no negotiation takes place; but, rather, it 
occurs in or through informal or non-formal contacts.
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Sudden Transitions
If during the negotiations, formal, informal, or non-formal, 
bargaining intensities increase to the point where movement is 
toward the fold (i.e., toward the opposing party's surface), then 
on crossing the tolerance limit, a catastrophe will occur. Thus 
there will be an abrupt change in system behavior. Consider a situa­
tion where management is militant yet negotiates with the union 
(i.e., within the bifurcation set). If management pushes and the 
union yields, the union may resist further acquiesance because of 
feeling that it has "given in,""played fair," or "negotiated in good 
faith." As a result, the union bargaining intensities may go up. 
Management, however, after winning some issues may experience a 
decline in its real bargaining intensities, yet continue to push 
the union, feeling that it can take advantage of the union's apparent 
retreat. Movement along the surface would follow path A on Figure 22. 
Suddenly there would be a shift to the strike prone surface as soon 
as the union's tolerance limit was reached. The reverse is also true 
or can be seen by examining line B on Figure 22. Notice that while 
sudden transitions can occur, they do not have to occur. There may 
be a smooth transition from strike to lockout and vice versa by moving 
along the back surface behind the cusp (see line C Figure 22). In 
real-world situations, this may represent a required or otherwise 
imposed cooling-off situation, when intensities are lowered, then 
rise again at a later date.
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Returning to lines A and B one can see that once a tolerance 
limit has been exceeded, it takes more effort before the system 
shifts back to its original position. That is, catastrophes occur 
at different points. A bargaining system which finally moves 
to a strike prone position from a lockout prone one requires signi­
ficantly greater increases in management's bargaining intensities 
to get it back to a lockout prone position (the same is true in 
reverse). Thus there is a form of hysteresis in the behavior.
Inaccessibility
During formal negotiations the bargaining parties are 
expected to attempt to win as many of their respective issues as 
possible. Thus, the bargaining behavior of the system will not 
exhibit neutrality. And, in fact, this would be the least likely 
behavior; and, therefore, it is not possible to reach the middle 
sheet. Obviously this compliments the assumption of bimodality 
(see Figure 23) .
Divergence
As bargaining intensities are increased during the informal 
start-up period, the system moves out on the surface. Upon reaching 
the singularity, a small difference in the bargaining intensities 
will move the system onto one of two totally different types of
FIGURE 23
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of behavior. Thus, slight changes in initial starting conditions 
can change the entire course of behavior for the bargaining system.
Comments on the Model
What the model provides is a way to include dynamism in 
modelling collective bargaining behavior. At a minimum, the new 
model is a pedogogical aid for showing students the variety of 
behaviors demonstrated in bargaining situations in fairly easy 
graphic terms. Furthermore, its quantitative underlyings allow 
researchers to use empirically-oriented approaches such as sensitivv 
analysis which can lead to precise testing and replication. Unlike 
the quantitative models presented earlier, construction of the model 
does not yield an instantaneous solution (outcome) without indicating 
the. process of how that optimum solution was obtained. Instead, the 
model shows the process of bargaining over time not apart from time. 
Additionally, the model does not depend on the assumption of rational 
behavior critical to utility theory based models.
Another conclusion from the model is that initial conditions 
are critical in setting the trajectories for the bargaining behaviors 
It would be prudent, consequently, for each participant to spend a 
great deal of effort eliminating unintended cues which would trigger 
increases in the opponent's intensities (such as inflammatory state­
ments) or prior to the start of negotiation activities. This results 
from the fact that a slight change in the initial conditions can
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change the trajectory from strike prone to lockout prone and 
vice-versa.
Lastly, the model also suggests that there are a number of 
"mini" catastrophes which can occur. Those near the singularity 
are probably almost imperceptible. Yet, once a shift occurs, it 
is harder to get the system back to where, it was because of the 
hysteresis effect. The small shifts back and forth may result from 
emotion shifts early in the process. Additionally, this may represent 
various types of "mini" crises which occur during negotiations well 
prior to a strike or lockout.
Precise statement of the mathematical surface of the model 
has not been given since it must ultimately be determined from real- 
xrorld data. The model used for experimental purposes was:
3 3
0 = x^ -/2 (4 + x) a ' + /2 (4 - x) b'
where
1
a ' = /2 (a + b)
1
b' = /2 (b - a) and a and b are the independent 
variables of the equation of the cusp given earlier. The development 
of the above equation is described in the next chapter. It should 
be noted that it is descriptively equivalent to Figure 20 except 
the origin is located at the cusp.
The model also suggests some new insights regarding bargain­
ing. For example, notice that as bargaining intensities increase,
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the bargaining zone widens. This is probably a result of the fact 
that as intensities go up there are more issues to deal with. Hence, 
with a greater issue complex there are more trade-offs possible, and 
a larger bargaining zone (see Figure 24).
This is unlike the basic limits-model approach which fixes 
the limits for a given issue or issue set; limits are flexible 
depending on the intensities. Notice also that the intensities do 
not work in direct opposition to one another (180° out of phase) 
but rather are orthogonal (90°). The interpretation is that in real 
bargaining, the bargaining units are not actually opposing one 
another, but rather are pulling in different directions. Where 
actual opposites occur, this is a pure conflict situation or war, 
and organizational demise is the most likely occurrence. An ortho­
gonal relationship allows for extreme differences, yet suggests 
that organizational demise is highly unlikely. That is, while the 
pull is in different directions, the system is not pulled apart.
FIGURE 24


















The Experimental Design: An Overview
Conceptually, the experimental design is simple. Data were 
gathered from union and management teams participating in a simulated 
bargaining game which yielded estimates of a system behavior, as well 
as union and management bargaining intensities. The values of the 
bargaining intensities were substituted into a modified version of 
the cusp catastrophe theory equation to generate predicted values of 
the system behavior. Finally, the predicted values were correlated 
with the actual values of system behavior to see if the model's 
predicted output matched the actual behavior.
As stated in Chapters Two and Three, the original form of 
the behavior surface as normally found in the literature is:
With the equation of the singularity set being the first partial 
derivative of the function with respect to x, or: (see Figure 25)
Mathematical Conversion of the Model




3x“ = b 
+ = /b73
Plot of singularities on xb plane
90
The equation of the projection of the set of singularities is found 
by solving equation (2) in terms of b and substituting back in the 
original equation which yields equation (3) below:
27a2 = 4b3 (3)
For plotting purposes, equation (3) may be rewritten as follows:
2^3+ a = (4)
/27
Note that, in this form, "a" is a normal factor and "b" is 
a splitting factor. However, for this bargaining situation, a 
conflicting factors model is needed. Consider what it would mean 
if bargaining intensities could take on negative values. For 
example, it might suggest that a union would refuse to take fringe 
benefits and possibly would strike in order not to get the benefits.
A plot of equation three is given in Figure 26, and the 



























The means of converting from a splitting factors model to a 
conflicting factors model is through a 45° rotation of the control 
surface about the behavior axis. This rotation is accomplished as 
follows:
Let sin 0 = and cos 0 =R R
If the angle of rotation is (j>, then the new coordinates (a1, b') are






R cos (0—cj)) = a' = R cos 0 cos <J> + R sin 0 sin cf>
R sin = b' = -R cos 0 sin <J) + R sin 0 cos <j>
and by substitution,
a' = a cos () + b sin d
b ' = -a sin (|) + b cos (})
In matrix notation,
[ab] ;coscj> - sin $ ! =[a'b']
i sin cf> cos (J) |
i   ’
1
At -j- radians (45°) both the cos c|) and sin § equal /2 and
1
a' = 2̂ (a + b)
1
b' = Yi (b - a)
The rotation will cause the result shown in Figure 28.
Notice that due to the spread of the cusp exceeding 90° as the 
curve goes out, it cuts back through a' and b'. This means that 
the shape of the original function does not match that assumed by 
the Oliva/Capdevielle model. To correct the situation, the original 
equation for the surface must be modified. Through trial and error,
FIGURE 28





a new equation was developed that appears to meet the descriptive 
requirements of the model, with the exception that its cusp starts 
at the origin. The new equation becomes:
3 3
x3 - ^  + x) a' + ^  b ' = 0
Obviously, the new transformed equation is more difficult to 
work with; consequently, the control variables will be measured in 
terms of "a'" and "b'" and then rotated back to "a" and "b" for ease 
in determining the value of x, which will still require the evalua­
tion of a cubic equation. The new working equation set becomes:
x3 - 12 a - 3bx = 0 (l1)
x3 - b = 0 (2')
36a2 = b3 (3')
+a = '^2 (V)
Figure 29 shows the new cusp and Table 6 gives both rotated 
and unrotated values.
The nature of the fold can be examined by taking a slice at 
"a" for a given value for "b". If, for example, "b" is chosen as 1, 
then the slice may be depicted as shown in Figure 30. Notice that 
the singularities (edges of the fold) are at +1 and indicate the 
point at which catastrophes can occur. A plot of the singularity set 
in the xb-plane is shown in Figure 31.
FIGURE 29
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A REPRESENTATIVE SLICE IN THE XA-PLANE
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It is assumed that the above mathematical modifications 
reasonably brought the mathematical model in line with the descrip­
tive model presented in Chapter Three. It is recognized that more 
empirical work would be needed to develop the "actual" model. In 
view of the claims made by proponents of catastrophe theory about 
its ability to model social science situations, there should be no 
problem dealing with whatever variance exists.
The Simulated Bargaining Game
The Murthy (1978) bargaining game was used to simulate a 
collective bargaining situation. Choice of a role-playing simula­
tion was made because of its greater ability to more closely 
approximate real world bargaining over a number of dimensions as 
pointed out earlier in Chapter Two. The Murthy game had been 
tested and from thorough discussions with those who had participated 
in it, there was a general concensus that it met their perceptions 
of what a collective bargaining situation would really be like.
This is an important point since the accuracy of the data derived 
from the subjects is heavily dependent in part on their perceptions 
of the realism of the situation.
Basically, Murthy's game consists of a contract which must 
be negotiated over twenty articles concerning items such as vacations, 
wages, grievance procedures, holidays, overtime, and the like. The 
articles of negotiation, however, were rearranged from Murthy's 
order to go from relatively neutral types of interaction (such as 
holidays) to more emotionally-charged ones (such as wages). This
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was done in order to aid in controlling the bargaining intensities, 
since the general direction of the change in intensities was assumed 
to be moving upward (i.e., increasing) because of the greater import­
ance of successively later articles.
In order to win the game, subjects bargained over each of the 
articles and attempted to "win" them for their team. Although they 
were told that certain articles were weighted toward either labor 
or management, they were not informed as to which articles fell 
which way or the actual amount of weighting involved. Table 7 
provides a list of articles and the payoff points which are associ­
ated with each.
Articles 1, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19 are in manage­
ment's favor while Articles 3, 9, and 17 are in union's favor. In 
order to win an article deemed to be in favor of the opposing team, 
and thereby receive the associated payoff points, a substantial 
shift in policy away from the status quo would have to occur. To 
win an article said to be in one's favor, a team would merely have 
to maintain the status quo. Appendix A contains a description of 
the bargaining game.
The Subjects
Sixteen junior and senior Business Administration majors 
were identified through the use of an attitudinal scale called Mach V
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developed by Christie^ and others (see Appendix B). Basically, the
instrument attempts to evaluate a person's approach to dealing with
people, "especially to the degree to which he feels other people
2are manipulable in interpersonal situations." It was assumed that
"'‘R. Christie, et. al. , Unpublished manuscript, Department of 
Social Psychology, Columbia University, 1968.
2John Robinson and Phillip Shaver, Measures of Social 
Psychological Attitudes, Institute for Social Research, University 
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1973, pp. 590-602.
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individuals who scored high on the questionnaire would be more com­
petitive in the game more and bargain with more intensity than those 
scoring low. Mach V scores range from 40 to 160. All participants 
had scores not loxver than 110 on the scale; this represents 21.89% 
of the total respondents (22% of males and 21% of females had at 
least this score or higher). In addition to the choice of partici­
pants by scores on the Mach V scale, only male students were chosen 
to help reduce as much as possible the effects of extraneous 
variables such as male-female interpersonal interactions. However, 
so that students would not know that females would be excluded, the 
Mach V examination was given to both males and females in four pro­
duction management sections (137 students). The utilization of 
students in production management courses was decided upon for two 
reasons. First, the researcher taught the four sections of this 
class which made the process of administering the questionnaire 
relatively simple and not overly disturbing to the students.
Secondly, for the most part, the students in the course were roughly 
at the same point in their college careers due to the general sequenc­
ing of the course within the College of Business curriculum. This 
again helped to aid in developing a somewhat homogeneous pool of 
subjects to draw from.
As an inducement to participate in the game in a serious 
manner, each student was told he would be awarded 10 points toward 
his final grade in the course for just playing the game, and an 
additional 10 points if his team won the game. A winning student
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could earn up to 5% of his total grade. Each student was also paid 
$2.50 per hour for his time as well as was provided with soft 
drinks and snacks.
The Experiment
The students were divided into 4 groups, each group having 
two union and two management representatives. Each group was 
viewed as a separate bargaining system for the purpose of the experi­
ment and played the game continuously for 225 minutes (3.75 hours).
Of this time, 180 minutes were divided into nine 20 minute bargain­
ing sessions. The other forty five minutes were broken up into five 
minute intervals between bargaining sessions in order to measure and 
control the independent variables. In order to try and cover as 
much of the surface as possible, an attempt to control the independ­
ent variables was made as follows. Group 1 was designated a control 
group and no attempt was made to modify the independent variables.
In Group 2, an attempt was made to increase management demand inten­
sities while keeping union demand intensities fairly stable. In 
Group 3, an attempt was made to increase union's demand intensities 
while keeping management demand intensities fairly stable. Lastly, 
in Group 4, an attempt was made to increase both management's and 
union's demand intensities. It was hoped that this procedure would 
"drive" the groups across the surface in different directions so 
that a cross section of the various tracks that a bargaining system 
might take would be sampled.
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The means of attempting to control the independent variable 
was accomplished by giving feedback to the groups during the five- 
minute break period between bargaining sessions. If, for example, 
there was a desire to increase management demand intensities, the 
management team was told that they were not. being aggressive enough 
or that they appeared to be losing the game. At the same time, the 
union team would be told that they were doing fine. To minimize 
time for the feedback process, the researcher and a faculty member 
provided the feedback stimuli. Each alternated in providing feed­
back to a team to attempt to block for differences in responses to 
the different individuals.
The environmental setting for the bargaining rounds was a 
behavioral laboratory where the teams were under both visual and 
audio surveillance throughout the entire bargaining process. Visual 
contact was made through one-way mirrors while audio contact was 
made through an intercom system which was switched to transmit 
only. In addition, to the bargaining room, each team had its own 
conference room for use throughout the process to fill out 
questionnaires, and for feedback discussions. Appendix C presents 
the basic layout of the experimental setting.
Given the unpredictability of behavior systems there is 
almost no way to guarantee that the desired control was absolutely 
maintained. However, even if the systems operate on their own, 
as long as they play the game honestly, the data obtained are of 
value in testing the model.
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The Measurement
The measurement of demand intensities was accomplished by 
using the first three questions on questionnaire number 1, as 
shown in Appendix D, while the measurement of the system's behavior 
was taken by using questionnaire 2 in Appendix E and question 
#1 on questionnaire number 1. Both of these are modifications 
of the ones used by Murthy in his study. The brevity of the 
questionnaire was necessary to minimize the time involved in 
gathering the data and consequently to reduce probe effect.
It if recognized that a more accurate measurement would probably 
require longer questionnaires, however, a modicum of precision 
must be sacrificed if the behavior system is to remain rela­
tively unchanged by the measurement process. Additionally, that 
they are essentially the same measurement tools as Murthy's 
helps because they have been pre-tested.
Scoring of the questionnaire proceeds as follows. After 
each round of bargaining, the questionnaires were, given to each 
team member in the team's respective conference room. Bargaining 
intensity for the round is simply the team response average for 
questions 1 through 3. For example, the following set of 
responses were found after a round (see Table 8).
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TABLE 8
SAMPLE CALCULATIONS OF THE BARGAINING INTENSITIES
Management Union
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
3 2 5 5
2 2 A 4
4 3 3 5
-> 7 12 <---------------> 14
^  = 2.67 ~  = 4.336 6
Then, management bargaining intensity for the round would be 2.67 
while unions' would be 4.33.
Determination of system behavior is found similarly by 
averaging the responses of all players to question 4 on questionnaire 
1 and adding them to the average response on questionnaire 2. 
Responses to question 4 are unidirectional in the sense that they 
register only intensity (points). Since the behavior range is posi­
tive and negative, management responses are assigned a negative 
value before averaging. Thus, the response range on question 4 
is from -8 to 8 depending on how the individual perceives the 
situation. (see Table 9)
TABLE 9
SAMPLE CALCULATIONS OF SYSTEM BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
Management Union
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1
Questionnaire 1 #4 -2 -2 = -4 7




9 10- 4  f = 2.25 ^  = 2.504 4








Determination of predicted values through the use of the 
equation was as follows. For each pair of bargaining intensities 
the cubic equation was solved for values of x. Where a single 
root was generated, that root was taken as the system's predicted 
behavior. If triple roots were generated, the middle value was 
eliminated as it represented the middle sheet point. Choice between 
the two remaining roots was made according to the past history of
the system as catastrophe theory suggests it should be done. That
is, if the system was on the bottom sheet (lockout prone) for the 
last round and the values of the intensities don't take the system 
across the bifurcation set, then the lower values would be chosen.
If the bifurcation set boundary had been crossed, then the highest 
value would be chosen.
Statistical Procedures
It is assumed that the questionnaires yield interval data.
The values for the independent variables (i.e., the management and
7Tunion bargaining intensities) are rotated radians, substituted 
into the equation for the surface; i.e.,
x3 - 12a - 3bx = 0
and the cubic equation is solved for the values of x (the bargaining
system behavior). This generates a set of predicted behavior based
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on the model which is compared with the system's actual behavior 
as measured by questionnaire 2 and 1.
In the ideal situation, the actual and predicted values would 
be identical, and a plot of actual against predicted would produce 
a 45° line coming out of the origin. Since this situation is 
unlikely, it is expected that there would not be a perfect linear 
relationship between actual and predicted values. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses is tested:
There is a positive relationship between 
the predicted and actual values.
is the main test of the descriptive, accuracy of the model 
for purposes of the proposed study. Additional support is obtained 
by examining the difference between the scores, which in the ideal 
case would be zero. Since it is assumed that the questionnaires 
provide interval data, the Pearson Product Moment Coefficient: of 
Correlation was used to evaluate . Each of the four groups were 
evaluated individually, then the entire data set was evaluated in 
total.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Results 
Scoring of the Game
Results of the bargaining game were relatively even. In 
groups I and III the union team won while in II and IV the manage­
ment team won. The scores are presented in Table 10.
TABLE 10
TEAM SCORES BY GROUP 
FROM THE BARGAINING GAMES
Group_______I______II III IV
Management 6 31 20 32
Union 44 14 30 18
Interestingly enough, in groups II and III where control was 
applied to attempt to drive up the intensities, the winning teams 
were those who received the positive feedback. That is, in group II, 
attempts were made to stimulate management's intensities while 
union's intensities were held stable with the reverse occurring in 
group III. For group II, management won while for group III, union
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won. In the control group union won while in the group where both 
intensities were driven up, management won the game.
The feedback procedure appears to have been successful in 
general. Average intensities for the entire data set were 3.8 for 
management and 3.19 for union. Thus, labor in general was less 
intense. Breakdown by groups tend to support the'fact that the feed­
back worked in general. See Table 11.
TABLE 11
AVERAGE BARGAINING INTENSITY RESPONSES BY GROUP
Group I II III IV
3.6 2.9 3.37 5.29
3.6 1.9 3.1 4.03
The Basic Data Set
A summary of the data from the questionnaire is presented in 
Table 12 below. Responses of the subjects by question are presented 
in Appendix F. It should be noted that four strikes occurred over 
the 36 observations while there were no lockouts.
Predicted values for the behavior system are presented in 
Table 13. The solution set and rotated intensities are presented 






























1 1.17 3.50 1.25 2. 33 1 . 3 1 0 4.50 4 .99 0 1.83 .43 3
i 9.00 9.S3 1.50 2. 33 2.67 1 . 00 1.17 2.67 .50 4.67 .93 -1.5
3 9.33 3.17 - .25 9.33 9 . 50 2 . 50 6.17 6. 50 5.25 4.17 2.93 -2.25
u 9.17 9. 67 -1.00 3.17 . 50 . 50 3. 33 2.33 - .75 6.00 4.77 -2.50
5 6.17 9.00 -1.25 .83 0 . 50 6.17 6.17 5.25 5.83 6.43 -1.00
6 .83 1.33 .25 9.50 1.67 . 2 5 2.00 2.5 0 - .75 7.50 7.50 7.50
7 9.83 3.17 - .75 9.83 9.67 2.25 3.00 2. 33 - .50 7.00 7.27 7.50
8 3.17 3.83 . 50 1 .67 .83 - .25 2. 33 2.17 1.25 4.67 5.10 1.00
9 9.33 5.50 - .50 3.50 1.50 -2.00 1.67 1.50 -1.25 6.00 4.77 1.75
*This table summarizes the data gathered from the questionnaire. The first two columns of each group represents the average 
intensities bv round for management and labor. The third column represents actual system behavior as derived from the 
questionnaires. Notice also that in general, the intensities moved as intended through the feedback procedure. Only 
Group Ill's data in the last portion of the game does not seem to conform to the desired result. However, if one looks 
at the total averages presented in Table 11, management tended to score higher in general, thus the feedback may have 
worked as intended, even though the values are slightly lower.
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TABLE 13
PREDICTED BARGAINING BEHAVIOR SCORES GENERATED BY THE MODEL
Rounds Group I Group II Group III Group IV
1 3.98 -3.23 4.59 -2.97
2 4.51 -3.1.1 3.44 -4.37
3 -4.27 -2. 72 5.23 -4.19
4 -4.21 -3.72 -3.77 -4.99
5 -5.02 -2.22 5.11 -5.00
6 2.51 -4.32 -2.84 5.64
7 -4.48 -4.52 -3.59 5.53
8 -3.67 -2.33 -3.16 4.64
9 -4.30 -3.87 -2.69 4.53
Table 14 presents a comparison of actual and predicted
values together. Notice that the actual values are lower than 
the predicted values on the average. This is a result of the 
averaging process used to generate the data. An adjustment factor 
(simply adding 2 in the direction of the sign of the actual values) 
was used in adjusting the data which brings it into descriptive 
harmony with the predetermined semantic set. The results are shown 
in Table 15. That is, it was noticed that the predicted values over­
stated or understated the actual values by approximately 
2. The cause of this is most probably due to the averaging process 
used in determining the actual values. From a correlation stand­
point, this makes no real difference in the results, however 




ACTUAL SYSTEM BEHAVIOR VALUES VERSUS PREDICTED
Group I Group II Group III Group IV
mds A P A P A P A P
1 1.25 3.98 0 -3.23 0 4.59 - 3 -2.97
2 1.50 4.51 1.00 -3.11 .5 3.44 -1.5 -4.37
3 - .25 -4.27 2.50 -2.72 5.25 5.32 -2.25 -4.19
4 -1.00 -4.21 .50 -3. 72 - .75 -3. 77 -2.5 -4.99
5 -1.25 -5.02 .50 -2.22 5.25 5.11 - 1 -5.00
6 .25 2.51 .25 -4.32 - .75 -2.84 7.5 5.64
7 - .75 -4.48 2.25 -4.52 - .5 -3.59 7.5 5.53
8 .50 -3.67 - .25 -2.33 1.25 -3.16 1.0 4.64
9 - .50 -4.30 -2.00 -3.87 -1.25 -2.69 1. 75 4.53
TABLE 15
ADJUSTED ACTUAL SYSTEM BEHAVIOR VALUES VERSUS PREDICTED
Group I Group II Group III Group IV
mds A P A P A P A P
1 3.25 3.98 0 -3.28 0 4.50 -5.00 -2.97
2 3.50 4.51 3.00 -3.11 2.50 3.44 -3.50 -4.37
3 -2.25 -4.27 4. 50 -2.72 7.25 5.32 -4.25 -4.19
4 -3.00 -4.21 2.50 -3.72 -2.75 -3.77 -4.50 -4.99
5 -3.25 -5.02 2.50 -2.22 8.25 5.11 -3.00 -5.00
6 2.25 2.51 2.25 -4.31 -2.75 -2.84 9.50 5.64
7 -2.75 -4.48 4.25 -4.52 -2.50 -3.59 9.50 5.53
8 2.50 -3.67 -2.25 -2.33 3.25 -3.16 3.00 4.64
9 -2.50 -4.30 -4.00 -3.87 -3.25 -2. 69 3.75 4.53
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Statistical Analysis
Correlation coefficients for the actual and predicted 
values by groups are shown in Table 16, and, the coefficients for 
the adjusted and predicted values are shown in Table 17.
TABLE 16
UNADJUSTED DATA— CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BY GROUP
Groups I II III IV
.86 .05 .71 .85
Total for Data Set .700
TABLE 17
ADJUSTED DATA— CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BY GROUP
Groups I II III IV
.85 -.12 .75 .82
Total for Data Set . 700
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Groups I, IV, and III have the highest correlation coeffi­
cients at .86, .85, and .71 respectively and are significant at the 
.01 level. Group II data uere uncorrelated. The apparent reason 
for the failure in this case seems to be due to the fact that the 
management team had had more exposure to bargaining theory through 
economics and management courses and personal background which made 
them more effective in their negotiations. The apparent result was 
that the labor team felt it was losing and gave up. This is reflected 
in the fact that average bargaining intensities for this group was 
the lowest set of the four. Thus, they reached solutions with less 
intensity (involvement). Notice that the average intensity for the 
union team was extremely low (1.9) indicating very little involvement. 
As stated earlier, there was an attempt to block for this type of 
problem, but this information was not revealed until after the experi­
ment was over. This is probably due to the students' desire to 
receive the extra points for a grade.
A further external pressure possibly affecting the group was 
the fact that the experiment for Group II was conducted the morning 
of the day that Louisiana State University's basketball team was to 
play on National television in the NCAA basketball tournament. Since 
the students were all male and had been discussing their interest in 
seeing the game, there may have been pressure to hurry up and get it 
over with. However, even if one includes what appears to be a set of 
nine bad observations in the total set of data, the thirty-six obser­
vations still yield a correlation coefficient of .700.
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Table 17 shows that the adjustment has some minor effects 
on the correlation coefficients, but results are essentially the 
same. From an aesthetic sense, the adjusted data is more appealing 
to work with though the original data gives somewhat better results. 
This occurs because the adjusted values are closer to those in the 
original descriptive model.
Conclusions
From the results presented, one can conclude that the correla­
tion coefficients seem to give added strength to the argument for 
the validity of the cusp-catastrophe model of collective bargaining. 
Both actual and adjusted values for groups I, II, and IV are quite 
high "explaining" not less than 50% of the variance and up to 72% 
of the variance for these three groups. Even the correlation 
coefficients of the total data set including the group II information 
is quite high at .70.
While the results are highly encouraging, the small sample 
size definitely suggests caution in applying the model. Perhaps the 
best way to describe the situation is to say that the results are 
strongly encouraging and suggest that further study is definitely 
warranted.
This study, along with the Murthy results, provides one of 
the more thorough tests of a catastrophe theory model in the social 
sciences. For the most part there has been no empirical testing of 
any of the proposed models. Zeeman's prison study data cited earlier
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really provides very little in the way of a test of the cusp as it 
is simply a plot of control variables with the behavior variable 
superimposed on the data that seem to fit inside a rather arbitrarily 
drawn cusp.
The Oliva/Capdevielle model has gone through several evolu­
tionary stages to its present state. However it is-recognized that 
more work and refinement is necessary on the descriptive aspects 
as well as further testing to support or disprove the validity of 
the model. At the least it seems to provide a new means for 
modelling the various characteristics of the bargaining system's 
behavior from strike to lockout.
Recommendations for Further Study
The first recommendation for further study would be to 
increase the number of observations. This could be done in any one 
of, or in all these ways:
A. Increase the number of measurements taken during 
the game by administering the questionnaire after 
each article.
B. Increase the length of the game, perhaps running 
it all day or over several days.
C. Increase the number of experimental runs.
Due to the experience with the second group, it is critical 
to watch the scheduling of the experiments. Even though the incen­
tives were good, there are certain short term situations which can
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interfere with the process, in this case, a basketball game 
Furthermore, a fix on the incentive may cause some distortion 
in the background information provided by prospective subjects.
A possible guard against this is an extensive interview with the 
subjects prior to the experiment. Unfortunately, the time and cost 
rise significantly.
Redesign of the questionnaires is also in order. Question­
naire one should be reduced to perhaps one or at most two questions, 
while the scale in questionnaire two should indicate that the negotia­
tion range goes up to strike in one direction and up to lockout in 
the other. In some cases there seemed to be some confusion at the 
start of the game regarding the negotiating response range. The 
change in question one is to get the responses in the minimum amount 
of time with the minimum description.
Lastly, other designs need to be developed, particularly 
those involving the use of real-world data. It would seem that the 
development of indices and bargaining intensities from real-world 
data using factor analysis, regression analysis, or some other 
statistical technique may be practical for those who have easy 
access to the business world.
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A G R E E M E N T
Article 1: Coverage
The bargaining unit is made up of all production and maintenance 
employees of the employer, excluding professional, managerial, 
supervisory, and clerical employees.
Article 2: Term
The term of this agreement begins on April 1, 1977, and continues 
through March 31, 1979. On or before February 1, 1979, one party 
officially notifies the other party, in writing, that it wants to 
end it.
Article 3: Recognition of Union and Management Functions
The Employer recognizes the union as the exclusive representative 
of all employees covered by this agreement for the purpose of 
collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours 
of employment, and other conditions of employment. The union 
recognizes that the employer has the right, on its own initiative, 
to perform any function of management at any time, so long as it 
does not violate any provision of this agreement.
Article 4: Holidays
The following days are on holiday list: New Year's Day, Good
Friday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, 
and Christmas Day. An employee is eligible for holiday benefits 
unless he is absent without permission or is on leave of absence.
The company may decide which jobs normally operate and which jobs 
normally close down on holidays.
Article 5: Service
In the normal circumstances, an employee's service accumulates in 
his regular classification.
Article 6: Proof of Service
In computing service, the records of personnel administration 
department shall be conclusive.
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Article 7: Assignment
It is the function of management to assign employees to jobs, 
classifications, training, and transfer. Such assignments 
shall be made by the company based on abilities, qualifications, 
seniority, and prevailing circumstances.
Article 8: Hours
The workweek is a period of five consecutive days beginning with 
Mayday. The working period is 7:45 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. with a 30 
minutes lunch break. In unusual circumstances, the employer may 
qhange the workweek and the working period.
Article 9: Seniority
One employee has higher job service than another employee if
1) He has longer service of the kind in question, or
2) Service of the kind in question is equal, and he has 
more service of the highest lower kind.
For purposes of determining seniority, all classifications are 
considered equal.
Article 10: Layoff
Before laying off employees, the company will notify the union of 
the impending layoff at least one month before its effective date. 
Employees scheduled for layoff will be permitted to voluntarily 
retire, provided they can qualify for early retirement, or 
voluntarily resign and receive severance pay.
Article 11: Order must be obeyed
When an employees feels aggrieved because of an order, he shall 
nevertheless obey the order, provided it does not involve serious 
danger to life.
Article 12: Qualification
It is the function of management to fix the qualifications for each 
job and post. The determination of abilities and qualifications 
of an employee shall be made by the company. The company may select 
an employee of less seniority for a higher job on the basis of 
ability and qualifications rather than on the basis of seniority 
alone.
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Article 13: Conditions which temporarily interrupt service
An employee is absent under conditions which temporarily interrupt 
service when he is absent from work, unless the absence is with 
permission, is followed by a return to work without interruption 
of employee status and appears on the following list:
1) An absence which has continued for not more than 10 
consecutive calendar days.
2) An absence for active military service.
3) An absence while on loan by the company.
4) An absence for sickness or accident of the employee,
provided a doctor certifies that the absence is
necessary.
5) An absence for vacation.
Article 14: Work Stoppages
There shall be no lockouts or strikes under any circumstances during 
the term of this agreement.
Article 15: Overtime
Time and one-half shall be payable after the 40-hour period in a 
workweek. The employer may schedule an employee for overtime work 
with or without prior notice. In the normal circumstances, such 
overtime is worked after eight hours have been worked in the day.
Article 16: Grievance Procedure
A claim that the company has violated this agreement is forfeited 
unless it is presented within 10 calendar days after the alleged 
violation occurs. This is true even though a continuing violation 
is alleged. Union may present the grievance in writing to the 
department head concerned. If the department head does not hear 
the grievance within 10 days after the request, the union may 
arrange a conference with the manager. The answer made by the 
company must be writing. The company's answer is final and 
binding, and no provisions for appeal or arbitration are provided 
herein.
Article 17: Vacation
An employee is eligible for vacation during a particular calendar 
year if his total service since the date of his employment or 
reinstatement is one year or more. An eligible employee is 
entitles to at least two weeks of vacation as follows:
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The vacation shall be scheduled according to a preselected vacation 
list in one period, except in unusual circumstances. Deadline for 
making selections shall be April 1 of each year. Weekends and 
holidays shall not be excluded from vacation period. When the 
calendar year ends, the employee loses all of the vacation he has 
not yet taken. In unusual circumstances, the company may recall 
an employee on vacation.
Article 18: Miscellaneous
The company may discipline an employee if he commits one of the 
posted offenses, with or without advance notice. Even though an 
employee does not commit a posted offence, his conduct or work 
performance may still be a cause for discipline. When the company 
disciplines an employee, it may impose any penalty which it deems 
appropriate. If the penalty imposed is discharge or suspension in 
excess of 10 working days, the employee may appeal to determine 
if the penalty was imposed after due process; however, reasonable­
ness of penalty itself will not constitute ground for appeal.
Article 19: Pay
In the normal circumstances, each employee shall be paid his rate 
in the classification he is working for all time payable.
Except where this agreement says otherwise, straight time shall be 


















1) Death in the family
2) Conferring with management
3) Vacation
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Article 20: Benefit plan
Nothing in this agreement shall affect the company's benefit plan 
(a. Annuity plan; b. long-term disability insurance plan; c. Acci­
dental death benefit plan; d. Contributory group life insurance 
plan; e. Family health insurance plan) or the administration thereof. 









List other Management Courses taken:
Do you consider yourself to be:
Pro Labor Pro Management   Neutra
Directions
You will find 20 groups of statements listed below. Each group 
is composed of three statements. Each statement refers to a way of' 
thinking about things or people in general. They reflect opinions 
and not matters of fact -- there are no "right" or "wrong" answers 
and different people have been found to agree with different 
s tatements.
Please read each of the three statements in each group. Then 
decide first which of the statements is most true or comes the
closest to describing your own beliefs. Circle a plus (+) in the
space provided.
Just decide which of the remaining two statements is mos t false 
or is the farthest from your own beliefs. Circle the minus [HI In 
the space provided.
Most Most
Here is an example: True False
A. It is easy to persuade people but hard to keep
them persuaded. +
B. Theories that run counter to common sense are a 
waste of time. (+)
C. It is only common sense to go along with what
other people are doing and not be too different. (E)
In this case, statement B would be the one you believe in most 
strongly and A and C would be ones that are not as characteristic 
of your opinion. Statement C would be the one you believe in least 
strongly and is least characteristic of your beliefs.
136
You will find some of the choices easy to make; others will be 
quite difficult. Do not fail to make a choice no matter how hard it 
may be. You will mark two statements in each group of three -- 
the one that comes the closest to your own beliefs with a + and the 
one farthest from your beliefs with a -. The remaining statement 
should be left unmarked.
Do not omit any groups of statements.
MACH V Most Most
1 rue Fals
1. A. It takes more imagination to be a successful criminal than a
successful business man. +
B. The phrase "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" 
contains a lot of truth. -)-
C. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the
loss of their property. +
2. A. Men are more concerned with the car they drive than with the
clothes their wives wear. +
B. It is very important that imagination and creativity in children
be cultivated. ^
C. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice
of being put painlessly to death. +
3. A. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is
useful to do so. +
B. The well-being of the individual is the goal that should be worked 
for before anything else. +
C. Once a truly intelligent person makes up his mind about the answer
to a problem he rarely continues to think about it. +
4. A. People are getting so lazy and self-indulgent that it is bad for our
country.
B. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. +
C. It would be a good thing if people were kinder to others less 
fortunate than themselves. +
5. A. Most people are basically good and kind. +
B. The best criteria for a wife or husband is compatibility— other 
characteristics are nice but not essential. +
C. Only after a man has gotten what he wants from life should be con­
cern himself with the injustices in the world. -r
6. A. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. +
B. Any man worth his salt shouldn't be blamed for putting his career 
above his family. +
C. People would be better off if they were concerned less with how
to do things and more with what to do. +
7. A. A good teacher is one who points out unanswered questions rather +




B. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give 
the real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which 
might carry more weight.
C. A person's job is the best single guide as to the sort of person he 
is. 4
8. A. The construction of such monumental works as the Egyptian pyramids
was worth the enslavement of the workers who built them.
B. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is best to 
stick to it.
C. One should take action only when sure that it is morally right.
9. A. The world would be a much better place to live in if people
would let the future take care of itself and concern themselves 
only with enjoying the present.
B. It is wise to flatter important people.
C. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing it us 
new circumstances arise.
10. A. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things you do 
because you have no other choice.
B. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is 
that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
C. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark of decenc> 
somewhere within him.
11. A. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be importan t
and dishonest. +
B. A man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of
succeeding in whatever he wants to do. +
C. If a thing does not help us in our daily lives, it isn't very
important. 4
12. A. A person shouldn't be punished for breaking a law which he thinks
is unreasonable. 4
B. Too many criminals are not punished for their crimes. 4
C. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 4
13. A. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they're forced to do SO . 4
B. Every person is entitled to a second chance, even after he commits
a serious mistake. 4
C. People who can't make up their minds aren't worth bothering about. 4
1A. A. A man's first responsibility is to his wife, not his mother. 4
B. Most men are brave. 4
C. It's best to pick friends that are intellectually stimulating rather






15. A. There are very few people in the world worth concerning oneself
about. +
B. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 1
C. A capable person motivated for his own gain is more useful to 
society than a well-meaning but ineffective one. +
16. A. It is best to give others the impression that you can change your
mind easily. +
B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with everyone. +
C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. +
17. A. It is possible to be good in all respects. +
B. To help oneself is good; to help others even better. +
C. War and threats of war are unchangeable facts of human life. +
18. A. Barnum was probably right when he said that there's at least one
sucker born every minute. +
B. Life is pretty dull unless one deliberately stirs up some excitement.
C. Most people would be better off if they controlled their emotions.
19. A. Sensitivity to the feelings of others is worth more than poise in
social situations. *
B. The ideal society is one where everybody knows his place and 
accepts it. +
C. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and
it will come out when they are given a chance. +
+
20. A. People who talk about abstract problems usually don't know what 
they are talking about.
B. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. +
C. It is essential for the functioning of a democracy that everyone
votes. +
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Team # _______________ Name
Round // Date
Directions: Read each question carefully and circle the appropriate
response which reflects your feelings on how the round 
just completed went. The scale values are: 0 = to no
extent, 4 = to some extent, 8 = to a very great extent.
1. To what extent do you feel that the other team may have been 
unduly rigid or inflexible in its negotiating.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2. To what extent did you get emotionally involved in this round 
of bargaining.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3. To what extent did you find yourself unwilling to compromise 
any further.
0 1 2 3 4 4 6 7 8
4. To what extent do you feel that the results of this round 
were unequitable to your team.




Team # _______________  Name_
Round # Date
Directions: Answer each qeustion by circling the appropriate
response which reflects your feelings of the overall 
situation.
1. At this point in time, how would you evaluate the overall 
situation?
Strike Union Union Union
Strike Imminent Militant Hostile Tense Neutral
5 4 3 2 1 0
Management Management Management Lockout
Tense Hostile Militant Imminent Lockout
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5





M Player 1 4
M Player 2 1
L Player 3 1
L Player 4 1
Group 2
M Player 1 4
M Player 2 3
L Player 3 3
L Player 4 4
Group 3
M Player 1 4
M Player 2 4
L Player 3 5
L Player 4 5
Group 4
M Player 1 2
M Player 2 1
L Player 3 0
L Player 4 0
Data From Questionnaire 1 
Question 1 






































































































Data From Questionnaire 1 
Question 2
Rounds 1 Rounds 2 Rounds 3 Rounds 4 Rounds 5 Rounds 6 Rounds 7 Rounds 8 Rounds 9
Group 1
M Player 1 2 4 5 6 7 1 3 2 4
M Player 2 0 3 3 3 5 0 5 2 5
L Player 3 3 ' 5 6 4 7 1 6 4 7
L Player 4 4 6 7 6 8 4 7 7 8
Group 2
M Player 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 5 3 3
M Player 2 4 2 4 2 0 3 4 0 3
L Player 3 1 1 3 3 0 0 3 1 1
L Player 4 0 5 8 0 0 3 8 4 5
Group 3
M Player 1 4 1 5 3 4 2 3 3 4
M Player 2 4 1 4 5 5 3 4 2 1
L Player 3 5 3 6 4 5 4 3 2 2
L Player 4 5 4 6 4 6 1 4 0 0
Group 4
M Player 1 0 3 4 5 7 6 6 7 6
M Player 2 3 6 5 7 7 8 8 7 3
L Player 3 0 1 1 2 4 5 5 4 4
L Player 4 0 2 1 7 8 8 8 6 5
143
Rounds 1 Rounds 2
Group 1
M Player 1 0 3
M Player 2 0  4
L Player 3 1 3
L Player 4 1 3
Group 2
M Player 1 2 2
M Player 2 0 0
L Player 3 0 0
L Player 4 0 7
Group 3
M Player 1 4 7
M Player 2 7 2
L Player 3 4






Data Frora Questionnaire 1 
Question 3


















































Data From Questionnaire 2
Rounds 1
M Player 1 -1.0
M Player 2 0.0
L Player 3 0.0
L Player 4 0.0
Avg. - .25
M Player 1 0.0
M Player 2 0.0
L Player 3 0.0
L Player 4 0.0
Avg. 0.0
M Player 1 0.0
M Player 2 0.0
L Player 3 0.0
L Player 4 0.0
Avg. 0.0
M Player 1 0.0
M Player 2 0.0
L Player 3 0.0
L Player 4 0.0
Avg. 0.0
Question 1
Rounds 2 Rounds 3 Rounds 4















0 . 0  0 . 0  - 1 . 0
0 . 0 0 . 0 2 . 0
0.0 0.0 0.0













































































































Rounds 1 Rounds 2 Rounds 3
M Player 1 /







M Player 1 / /
M Player 2 /
L Player 3 /
L Player 4 /
M Player 1
M Player 2 /
L Player 3 /
L Player 4 /
Data From Questionnaire 2 
Question 2















6 . 2 6
0 . 5 9
5 . 3 0  
-  .83
6 . 2 5
.35
7 . 1 9




2 . 5 9  
-  .71
3 . 5 3
.24
6 . 2 5
.12
2 . 5 9









1 . 0 6
8 . 9 6
.24
4 . 0 1  
-  .71





- -1 . 60  
-  .99
2 . 71
1 . 0 6
5 . 0 2  
-  .87
7 . 61  
-  .87
8 . 6 7
.42
Solution Set of Predicted Val
Group I 3 . 98 - 4 . 1 2  -  .38  
4 . 1 5
- 4 . 2 7  
. 64 
3 . 6 3
- 4 . 2 1  
-  . 23  
4 . 4 4
- 5 . 0 2
.88
4 . 1 4
Group II - 3 . 2 2 - 3 . 1 1
.22
3 . 38
- 2 . 7 1 - 3 . 7 2 - 2 . 2 2
Group III - 4 . 3 8  
-  .21  
4 . 5 9
3 . 44 - 5 . 1 3  
-  .11 
5 . 2 4
- 3 . 7 7
.73
3 . 04
- 5 . 1 1
0
5. 11
Group IV - 2 . 9 7 - 4 .  37 - 4 . 1 9
.72
3 . 47
4 . 9 9  
. 4 6 
4 . 5 3
- 5 . 0 0  
-  . 20  
5 .1 9
1 . 5 3 5 . 6 6 4 . 2 4 6 . 9 5
.35 - 1 . 1 8 -  .24 .83
4 . 3 6 6 . 7 2 1 . 41 3 . 54
- 2 . 0 0 -  .12 -  .24 - 1 . 4 1
3 . 1 8 3 . 7 7 3 . 1 8 2 . 24
.35 -  .47 -  .12 -  .12
1 0 . 61 1 0 . 0 9 6 . 9 1 7 . 6 1
0 .19 .31 -  .87
2 . 51 - 4 . 8 8 - 3 . 6 7 - 4 . 3 0
.87 .22 -  . 50
3 . 1 6 3 . 45 4 . 7 9
- 4 . 3 2 - 4 . 5 2 - 2 . 3 3 - 3 . 8 7
.07 .78
4 . 4 5 1 . 56
1 ro 00 .o - 3 . 5 9 - 3 . 1 6 2 . 69
-  . 45 .51 .15 .21
3 . 2 9 3 . 0 8 3 . 01 2 . 4 8
- 5 . 6 4 —5 . 4 6 -  4 . 4 h - 4 . 9 9
0 .07 -  . ' 8 . 46
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